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The Research Agenda: Marco Bassetto on the Quantitative Evaluation of Fiscal Policy Rules

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Author Info
Marco Bassetto (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago)

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Abstract

Marco Bassetto is a Senior Economist in the Economic Research Department at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago. He is interested in political-economy models of fiscal policy and in applications of game theory to the analysis of macroeconomic policy more in general. This piece reflects the personal views of the author and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago or the Federal Reserve System.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Review of Economic Dynamics in its journal EconomicDynamics Newsletter.

Volume (Year): 10 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages:
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Handle: RePEc:red:ecodyn:v:10:y:2009:i:2:agenda

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  1. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," NBER Working Papers 1838, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Barro, Robert J, 1979. "On the Determination of the Public Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 87(5), pages 940-71, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Sanguinetti, Pablo & Tommasi, Mariano, 2004. "Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 149-170, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Besley, Timothy & Smart, Michael, 2007. "Fiscal restraints and voter welfare," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(3-4), pages 755-773, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Bassetto, Marco & Kocherlakota, Narayana, 2004. "On the irrelevance of government debt when taxes are distortionary," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 299-304, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Borys Grochulski & Narayana Kocherlakota, 2007. "Nonseparable Preferences and Optimal Social Security Systems," NBER Working Papers 13362, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "Fiscal Policy over the Real Business Cycle: A Positive Theory," NBER Working Papers 14047, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(3), pages 403-14, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. John P. Conley & Antonio Rangel, 2001. "Intergenerational Fiscal Constitutions: How to Protect Future Generations Using Land Taxes and Federalism," NBER Working Papers 8394, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Auerbach, Alan J & Gokhale, Jagadeesh & Kotlikoff, Laurence J, 1994. "Generational Accounting: A Meaningful Way to Evaluate Fiscal Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 73-94, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Mieszkowski, Peter & Zodrow, George R, 1989. "Taxation and the Tiebout Model: The Differential Effects of Head Taxes, Taxes on Land Rents, and Property Taxes," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(3), pages 1098-1146, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 623-46, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Thomas F. Cooley & Jorge Soares, 1999. "A Positive Theory of Social Security Based on Reputation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(1), pages 135-160, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Marina Azzimonti Renzo, 2004. "On the dynamic inefficiency of governments," 2004 Meeting Papers 228, Society for Economic Dynamics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Kenneth Rogoff, 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles," NBER Working Papers 2428, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. S. Rao Aiyagari & Albert Marcet & Thomas J. Sargent & Juha Seppala, 2002. "Optimal Taxation without State-Contingent Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(6), pages 1220-1254, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  18. Marco Bassetto & Vadym Lepetyuk, 2007. "Government Investment and the European Stability and Growth Pact," NBER Working Papers 13200, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  19. Per Krusell & Jose-Victor Rios-Rull, 1999. "On the Size of U.S. Government: Political Economy in the Neoclassical Growth Model," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1156-1181, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  20. Marco Battaglini & Stephen Coate, 2008. "A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(1), pages 201-36, March. [Downloadable!]
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  21. Marco Bassetto, 2008. "Political Economy of Taxation in an Overlapping-Generations Economy," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 18-43, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Marco Bassetto & Thomas J Sargent, 2006. "Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 121(4), pages 1167-1210, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  23. Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1996. "Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 104(5), pages 979-1009, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Song, Zheng & Storesletten, Kjetil & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 2007. "Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico-Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt," Memorandum 05/2008, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  25. Antonio Rangel, 2005. "How to Protect Future Generations Using Tax-Base Restrictions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 314-346, March. [Downloadable!]
  26. Ben D. Peletier & Robert A. J. Dur & Otto H. Swank, 1999. "Voting on the Budget Deficit: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1377-1381, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  27. Bohn, Henning & Inman, Robert P., 1996. "Balanced-budget rules and public deficits: evidence from the U.S. states," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 13-76, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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This page was last updated on 2009-10-30.

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