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Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

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  • Albert Solé-Ollé

    ()
    (Universitat de Barcelona, IEB & Cesifo)

  • Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal

    ()
    (Universitat de Barcelona & IEB)

Abstract

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass comprehensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) in its series Working Papers with number 2010/45.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: 2010
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Handle: RePEc:ieb:wpaper:2010/10/doc2010-45

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Keywords: Land use regulations; urban growth controls; political economy.;

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References

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  1. Albert Sole-Olle & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2010. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain," Working Papers in Economics, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia 248, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  2. Cheshire, Paul & Sheppard, Stephen, 2004. "Land markets and land market regulation: progress towards understanding," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 34(6), pages 619-637, November.
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  14. Brueckner, Jan K. & Lai, Fu-Chuan, 1996. "Urban growth controls with resident landowners," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 26(2), pages 125-143, April.
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  16. Mukand, Prof Sharun & Kaplan, Dr Ethan, 2011. "Persistence of Political Partisanship: Evidence from 9/11," CAGE Online Working Paper Series, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE) 43, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2013. "Do Political Parties Matter for Local Land Use Policies?," CESifo Working Paper Series 4284, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2010. "Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain," Working Papers, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) 2010/45, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  3. Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2014. "Does corruption erode trust in government? Evidence from a recent surge of local scandals in Spain," Working Papers, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) 2014/26, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  4. Costas-Pérez, Elena & Solé-Ollé, Albert & Sorribas-Navarro, Pilar, 2012. "Corruption scandals, voter information, and accountability," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 469-484.
  5. Elena Costas-Pérez & Albert Solé-Ollé & Pilar Sorribas-Navarro, 2011. "Corruption scandals, press reporting, and accountability. Evidence from Spanish mayors," Working Papers, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) 2011/9, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  6. Miquel-Àngel Garcia-López & Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans Marsal, 2014. "Do Land Use Policies Follow Road Construction," CESifo Working Paper Series 4672, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2011. "Local spending and the housing boom," Working Papers, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB) 2011/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  8. Albert Solé-Ollé & Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal, 2013. "The Influence Wielded by Land Developer Lobbies During the Housing Boom: Recent Evidence From Spain," CESifo DICE Report, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 11(2), pages 43-49, 07.

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