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The Political Economy of Capital Controls

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Author Info
Alesina, Alberto F
Grilli, Vittorio
Milesi-Ferretti, Gian Maria

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Abstract

This paper studies the institutional and political determinants of capital controls in a sample of 20 OECD countries for the period 1950<196>89. One of the most interesting results is that capital controls are more likely to be imposed by strong governments, which have a relatively `free' hand over monetary policy, because the Central Bank is not very independent. By imposing capital controls these governments raise more seigniorage revenue and keep interest rates artificially low. As a result, public debt accumulates at a slower rate than otherwise. This suggests that an institutional reform which makes the Central Bank more independent makes it more difficult for the government to finance its budget. The tightening of the fiscal constraint may force the government to adjust towards a more `sound' fiscal policy. We also find that, as expected, and in accordance with the theory, capital controls are more likely to be introduced when the exchange rate is pegged or managed. We found no effects of capital controls on growth, however, and reject rather strongly the hypothesis that capital controls reduce growth.

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Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 793.

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Date of creation: Jul 1993
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:793

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Related research
Keywords: Capital Controls; Political Economy; Seigniorage;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
E22 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Capital; Investment; Capacity
E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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  30. Dooley, Michael P & Isard, Peter, 1980. "Capital Controls, Political Risk, and Deviations from Interest-Rate Parity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 370-84, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  35. Giovannini, Alberto, 1991. "Government Revenue from Financial Repression," CEPR Discussion Papers 489, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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