Government Revenue from Financial Repression
AbstractThis paper analyses, from a public-finance perspective, the theoretical underpinnings and the empirical relevance of the phenomenon of financial repression. The analysis explicitly accounts for the interaction between capital controls and financial repression. The proposed empirical estimate of the revenue from financial repression is based on the difference between the domestic and the foreign cost of borrowing of the government. The correlations of the revenue from financial repression with inflation, exchange rates and per-capita income are discussed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 489.
Date of creation: Jan 1991
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