Economic Integration and Political Accountability
AbstractThis paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians, In a framework the politicians are only controled through reelection rules, we study the effect of economic integration on the reelection rules chosen by the voters and try to establish a link between economic integration and accountability. We first define economic integration noe only by the existence of externalities between countries but also by the positive correlation of shocks accross the countries. Then, from a political point of view, we show that economic integration is a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, the correlation of shocks allows yardstick comparison which is good for the control of politicians. On the other hand, it induces a lack of responsability because of the existence of externalities. Therefore, the political effect of economic integration depends on the relative strength of those two effects.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 00-540.
Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
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More information through EDIRC
INFORMATION ; ELECTIONS ; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
- P45 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages
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