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Economic Integration and Political Accountability

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Author Info
Zantman, W.

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Abstract

This paper studies to what extent economic integration, or globalization, influences the accountability of politicians, In a framework the politicians are only controled through reelection rules, we study the effect of economic integration on the reelection rules chosen by the voters and try to establish a link between economic integration and accountability. We first define economic integration noe only by the existence of externalities between countries but also by the positive correlation of shocks accross the countries. Then, from a political point of view, we show that economic integration is a two-sided phenomenon. On the one hand, the correlation of shocks allows yardstick comparison which is good for the control of politicians. On the other hand, it induces a lack of responsability because of the existence of externalities. Therefore, the political effect of economic integration depends on the relative strength of those two effects.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Toulouse - GREMAQ in its series Papers with number 00-540.

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Length: 30 pages
Date of creation: 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:gremaq:00-540

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Related research
Keywords: INFORMATION ; ELECTIONS ; ECONOMIC INTEGRATION;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
P45 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - International Linkages

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. David K. Backus & Patrick J. Kehoe & Finn E. Kydland, 1993. "International Business Cycles: Theory and Evidence," Working Papers 93-21, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
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  2. Giancarlo Corsetti & Paolo Pesenti, 2001. "Welfare And Macroeconomic Interdependence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(2), pages 421-445, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Robert C. Feenstra, . "Integration Of Trade And Disintegration Of Production In The Global Economy," Department of Economics 98-06, California Davis - Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Mukand, Sharun W., 2006. "Globalization and the `confidence game'," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 406-427, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. Rodrik, Dani, 1998. "Symposium on Globalization in Perspective: An Introduction," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 3-8, Fall. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Andrei Shleifer, 1985. "A Theory of Yardstick Competition," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 16(3), pages 319-327, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Sundaram, Rangarajan K., 1998. "Optimal Retention in Agency Problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 293-323, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Neumeyer, Pablo Andres, 1998. "Currencies and the Allocation of Risk: The Welfare Effects of a Monetary Union," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 246-59, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Mookherjee, Dilip, 1984. "Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 433-46, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Wolfers, Justin, 2002. "Are Voters Rational? Evidence from Gubernatorial Elections," Research Papers 1730, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Breton, Albert & Ursprung, Heinrich, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Cheikbossian, Guillaume & Sand-Zantman, Wilfried, 2008. "The Incentives to Cooperate in Local Public Goods Supply: A Repeated Game with Imperfect Monitoring," IDEI Working Papers 527, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
  3. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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