A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress
AbstractThis paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office- motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show fi…rst that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., uni…ed government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under uni…ed government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off. JEL classi…cation: D72. Keywords: Party discipline; Political agency; Retrospective voting; Office-motivated politicians.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2072/151813.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Disciplina de partit; 32 - Política;
Other versions of this item:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-12-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-12-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-CTA-2011-12-13 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-POL-2011-12-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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