Comparing constitutions:: Cohesion and distribution in legislatures
AbstractNo abstract is available for this item.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Persson, Torsten & Roland , Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997.
"Comparative Politics and Public Finance,"
633, Stockholm University, Institute for International Economic Studies.
- Persson, T. & Roland, G. & Tabellini, G., 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Papers 633, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, . "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," Working Papers 114, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gérard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Comparative Politics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 1737, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Daniel Diermeier & Timothy J. Feddersen, 1996. "Disciplined Coalitions and Redistribution: The Effect of the Vote of Confidence Procedure on Legislative Bargaining," Discussion Papers 1171, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Helpman, E. & Persson, T., 1998.
"Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining,"
08-98, Tel Aviv.
- Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 6589, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 1998. "Lobbying and Legistlative Bargaining," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1837, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert J., 2007.
"On the Optimal Number of Representatives,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
6417, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- E. Auriol & R. Gary-Bobo, 2000. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," THEMA Working Papers 2000-01, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise.
- Emmanuelle Auriol & Robert J. Gary-Bobo, 1998. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," Discussion Papers 1286, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Auriol, Emmanuelle & Gary-Bobo, Robert, 2008. "On the Optimal Number of Representatives," IDEI Working Papers 86, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011.
"A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress,"
29890, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2012. "A rationale for intra-party democracy," MPRA Paper 39091, University Library of Munich, Germany.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.