Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Coalition politics and accountability

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kiss, Áron

Abstract

The paper introduces the possibility of coalition government into the theoretical study of political accountability and analyzes the accountability of coalitions as a problem of team production. It is shown that coalition governments can be held accountable in the presence of an electoral alternative. Accountability becomes problematic if it is certain that at least one of the coalition parties stays in power after the elections. Such a coalition (sometimes called a ‘unity government’) cannot be given appropriate collective incentives. To incentivize government performance, voters make one coalition party responsible for the outcome. This, however, makes the other coalition party interested in sabotage. The paper analyzes the resulting conflict and characterizes optimal voter strategy. -- In dieser Arbeit wird die theoretische Analyse der politischen Verantwortlichkeit auf die Situation einer Koalitionsregierung angewandt. Reduziert auf den vertragstheoretischen Kern des Problems stellen Koalitionsregierungen ein ‘Teamprodukt’ für den Wähler als Prinzipal her, wobei der ‘Vertrag’ zwischen Wählern und Koalitionsregierung sehr spezifisch und jedenfalls unvollständig ist. Es wird gezeigt, dass die Disziplinierbarkeit einer Koalition unproblematisch ist, wenn eine wahre Wahlalternative vorhanden ist. Die Disziplinierbarkeit (also die politische Verantwortlichkeit) wird problematisch in einer Situation, in der sich eine Koalition verschiedener Parteien ergibt, zu der es keine echte mehrheitsfähige Alternative gibt, und die als ‘Große Koalition’ bezeichnet werden soll. Die Besonderheit der Großen Koalition ist, dass mindestens eine der beteiligten Parteien mit Sicherheit nach den nächsten Wahlen weiterregiert. Nur Teile der Regierung können abgewählt werden; die große Koalition als Einheit kann in dieser Situation von den Wählern nicht in toto ‘belohnt’ oder ‘bestraft’ werden. Die Arbeit beschreibt die beste Strategie des repräsentativen Wählers in einem stilisierten politischen System, in dem die ‘Große Koalition’ regiert. Es wird gezeigt, dass der Wähler den Regierungspolitikern nur dann Anreize setzen kann, wenn er eine der Regierungsparteien für die Regierungspolitik verantwortlich macht. Dies führt jedoch zu einem Konflikt zwischen den Regierungsparteien, weil es die jeweils andere Regierungspartei zu Sabotage animiert.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/51095/1/613272129.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number SP II 2009-01.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200901

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Reichpietschufer 50, 10785 Berlin
Phone: +49 (0)30 25491-402
Fax: +49 (0)30 25491-400
Email:
Web page: http://www.wzb.eu/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Johannes Münster, 2007. "Selection Tournaments, Sabotage, and Participation," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 16(4), pages 943-970, December.
  2. Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J., 1991. "Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models," RCER Working Papers 283, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
  3. Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition," NBER Working Papers 4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Jochen Mierau & Richard Jong-A-Pin & Jakob de Haan, 2007. "Do political variables affect fiscal policy adjustment decisions? New empirical evidence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 133(3), pages 297-319, December.
  5. Lazear, Edward P, 1989. "Pay Equality and Industrial Politics," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 561-80, June.
  6. Dan Kovenock & Michael R. Baye & Casper G. de Vries, 1996. "The all-pay auction with complete information (*)," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 291-305.
  7. Konrad, Kai A, 2001. "Investment in the Absence of Property Rights: The Role of Incumbency Advantages," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 3050, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Roubini, Nouriel & Sachs, Jeffrey D., 1989. "Political and economic determinants of budget deficits in the industrial democracies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(5), pages 903-933, May.
  9. Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September.
  10. Reyes Illera & Carlos Mulas-Granados, 2008. "What makes fiscal consolidations last? A survival analysis of budget cuts in Europe (1960–2004)," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 147-161, March.
  11. Persson, Torsten & Roland, Gerard & Tabellini, Guido, 1997. "Separation of Powers and Political Accountability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1163-1202, November.
  12. John Ashworth & Benny Geys & Bruno Heyndels, 2005. "Government Weakness and Local Public Debt Development in Flemish Municipalities," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 395-422, August.
  13. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
  14. Mathias Dewatripont & Paul Seabright, 2006. ""Wasteful" public spending and state aid control," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/165574, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
  15. Volkerink, Bjorn & De Haan, Jakob, 2001. " Fragmented Government Effects on Fiscal Policy: New Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 109(3-4), pages 221-42, December.
  16. Nannestad, Peter & Paldam, Martin, 1994. " The VP-Function: A Survey of the Literature on Vote and Popularity Functions after 25 Years," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 79(3-4), pages 213-45, June.
  17. Bornier Jean Magnan de & Norpoth H. & Lewis-Beck M.S. & Lafay J.D., 1991. "Economics and Politics The calculus of support," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 2(4), pages 3, December.
  18. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  19. Yeon-Koo Che & Seung-Weon Yoo, 2001. "Optimal Incentives for Teams," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 525-541, June.
  20. Alex Segura-Ubiergo & Taline Koranchelian & Carlos Mulas-Granados, 2008. "Reforming Government Subsidies in the New Member States of the European Union," IMF Working Papers 08/165, International Monetary Fund.
  21. Albert Solé Ollé, 2005. "The effects of party competition on budget outcomes: Empirical evidence from local governments in Spain," Working Papers 2005/2, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  22. John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
  23. Itoh, Hideshi, 1991. "Incentives to Help in Multi-agent Situations," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 59(3), pages 611-36, May.
  24. Kong-Pin Chen, 2003. "Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, Oxford University Press, vol. 19(1), pages 119-140, April.
  25. Mulas-Granados, Carlos & Sanz, Ismael, 2008. "The dispersion of technology and income in Europe: Evolution and mutual relationship across regions," Research Policy, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 37(5), pages 836-848, June.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Aron Kiss, 2011. "Divisive Politics and Accountability," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1115, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
  2. Maria Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa, 2011. "Political competition and politician quality: evidence from Italian municipalities," Public Choice, Springer, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 547-559, September.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200901. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ZBW - German National Library of Economics).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.