Joint Production in Teams

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Joint Production in Teams

Author Info

Battaglini, Marco

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Marco Battaglini

Abstract

Consider Holmström.s moral hazard in teams problem when there are n agents, each agent i has a a(i)-dimensional strategy space and output can be m-dimensional. We show that a compensation mechanism that satisfies budget balance, limited liability and implements an efficient allocation generically exists if and only if Sum_a(i)/(n-1)< m. When this condition is satisfied, the optimal mechanism discourages collusive behavior and, under a weak condition, filters out inefficient equilibria.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4702.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Oct 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4702

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Other versions of this item:

Article
- Battaglini, Marco, 2006. "Joint production in teams," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 130(1), pages 138-167, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2005-02-13 (All new papers)
NEP-MIC-2005-02-13 (Microeconomics)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Áron Kiss, 2009. "Coalition politics and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 139(3), pages 413-428, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jianpei Li, 2009. "Team production with inequity-averse agents," Portuguese Economic Journal, Springer, vol. 8(2), pages 119-136, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alex Gershkov & Jianpei Li & Paul Schweinzer, 2006. "Collective Production and Incentives," Discussion Papers 186, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? IDEAS uses the data collected within the RePEc project, the largest online bibliographic database in Economics.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.