Efficiency in partnerships
AbstractWe provide the necessary and sufficient condition for a partnership to be able to sustain efficiency when the output is stochastic. When limited liability is imposed, we show that only the level of the average liability of the partnership is important; the individual levels of liability are irrelevant. However, the allocation of the total liability among the partners is crucial when additional conditions such as neutrality or individual rationality are imposed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles in its series ULB Institutional Repository with number 2013/7044.
Date of creation: 1991
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (1991) v.55 nÂ° 2,p.296-322
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