AbstractWe find that sequential division of labor and deadlines help alleviate the free rider problem. Conversely,indivisibility of tasks, the number of partners, and asymmetries between agents are shown to increase the expected time to completion. The model may be applied to academic co-authorship, as well as to research and development joint ventures.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Society for Economic Dynamics in its series 2009 Meeting Papers with number 1019.
Date of creation: 2009
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