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Continuous Time Repeated Games

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Author Info
Bergin, James
MacLeod, W Bentley

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Abstract

In this paper, the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may be large--in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s. The authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a Cournot duopoly example. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 34 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 21-37
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Handle: RePEc:ier:iecrev:v:34:y:1993:i:1:p:21-37

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  4. Rida Laraki & Eilon Solan & Nicolas Vieille, 2003. "Continuous-time Games of Timing," Discussion Papers 1363, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Lones Smith & Ennio Stacchetti, 2002. "Aspirational Bargaining," Game Theory and Information 0201003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  6. Boone, J., 2003. "'Be nice, unless it pays to fight' : a new theory of price determination with implications for competition policy," Discussion Paper 11, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Bo Honore & Aureo de Paula, 2008. "Interdependent Durations," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-007, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Bo E. Honore & Aureo de Paula, 2007. "Interdependent Durations, Second Version," PIER Working Paper Archive 08-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 01 Nov 2008. [Downloadable!]
  10. Michele Moretto & Paola Valbonesi, . "Dynamic Firm Regulation with Endogenous Profit-Sharing," Working Papers ubs0410, University of Brescia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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