Continuous Time Repeated Games
Abstract
In this paper, the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may be large--in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s. The authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a Cournot duopoly example. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.Download Info
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association in its journal International Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 34 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 21-37
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