On Sequential and Simultaneous Contributions under Incomplete Information
AbstractUnder incomplete information about (independent) private valuations of a public good, we establish sufficient conditions under which, despite the incentive to free ride on future contributors, the expected total amount of voluntary contributions is higher when agents contribute sequentially (observing prior contributions) rather than simultaneously. We establish this in a conventional framework with quasi-linear utility where agents care only about the total provision of the public good (rather than individual contribution levels) and there is no non-convexity in provision of the public good. We allow for arbitrary number of agents and fairly general distribution of types.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 0805.
Date of creation: Aug 2008
Date of revision: Nov 2008
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, P.O. Box 750496, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496
Web page: http://www.smu.edu/economics
Contribution games; public good; incomplete information.;
Other versions of this item:
- Parimal Bag & Santanu Roy, 2011. "On sequential and simultaneous contributions under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 40(1), pages 119-145, February.
- D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-08-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2008-08-14 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-EXP-2008-08-14 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2008-08-14 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SEA-2008-08-14 (South East Asia)
- NEP-UPT-2008-08-14 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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