Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence
AbstractWe provide an explanation for peer pressure in teams based on inequity aversion. Analyzing a two-period model with two agents, we find that the effect of inequity aversion strongly depends on the information structure. When contributions are unobservable, agents act as if they were purely selfish. However, when contributions are made transparent at an interim stage, agents exert higher efforts in the first period and adjust their efforts according to the interim information in the second period. This form of peer pressure reduces free-riding and thus, more efficient outcomes are attained. The results are confirmed in a real effort experiment.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 3281.
Length: 39 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Journal of Labor Economics, 26 (4), 2008, 693 - 720
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Other versions of this item:
- Alwine Mohnen & Kathrin Pokorny & Dirk Sliwka, 2008. "Transparency, Inequity Aversion, and the Dynamics of Peer Pressure in Teams: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 26(4), pages 693-720, October.
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- M12 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Business Administration - - - Personnel Management; Executives; Executive Compensation
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-02-02 (All new papers)
- NEP-EXP-2008-02-02 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2008-02-02 (Labour Economics)
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