A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress
This paper studies party discipline in a congress within a political agency framework with retrospective voting. Party discipline serves as an incentive device to induce office-motivated congress members to perform in line with the party leadership's objective of controlling both the executive and the legislative branches of government. I show first that the same party is more likely to control both branches of government (i.e., unified government) the stronger the party discipline in the congress is. Second, the leader of the governing party imposes more party discipline under unified government than does the opposition leader under divided government. Moreover, the incumbents' aggregate performance increases with party discipline, so a representative voter becomes better off.
|Date of creation:||01 Feb 2011|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany|
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Eguia, Jon X., 2011. "Voting blocs, party discipline and party formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 111-135, September.
- Josep Colomer, 2005.
"Policy making in divided government: A pivotal actors model with party discipline,"
Springer, vol. 125(3), pages 247-269, December.
- Josep M. Colomer, 2005. "Policy making in divided government. A pivotal actors model with party discipline," Economics Working Papers 817, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Feddersen, Timothy J., 1998. "Comparing constitutions:: Cohesion and distribution in legislatures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 665-672, May.
- Fernanda Brollo & Tommaso Nannicini, 2010.
"Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil,"
358, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Brollo, Fernanda & Nannicini, Tommaso, 2011. "Tying Your Enemy’s Hands in Close Races: The Politics of Federal Transfers in Brazil," IZA Discussion Papers 5698, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Iaryczower, Matias, 2008. "Contestable Leadership: Party Leaders as Principals and Agents," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 203-225, October.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1995.
"Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 110(3), pages 769-798.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1993. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits," NBER Working Papers 4575, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Robert Barro, 1973. "The control of politicians: An economic model," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 19-42, March.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 1992.
"Incumbent Behavior: Vote Seeking, Tax Setting and Yardstick Competition,"
NBER Working Papers
4041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Besley, Timothy & Case, Anne, 1995. "Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 25-45, March.
- Timothy Besley & Anne Case, 2003.
"Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States,"
Journal of Economic Literature,
American Economic Association, vol. 41(1), pages 7-73, March.
- Tim Besley, 2002. "Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States," IFS Working Papers W02/13, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
- Besley, Timothy J. & Case, Anne, 2002. "Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States," CEPR Discussion Papers 3498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sam Peltzman, 1992. "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 327-361.
- Torsten Persson & Gerard Roland & Guido Tabellini, .
"Separation of Powers and Political Accountability,"
100, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Sundadam, R.K. & Banks, J., 1991. "Adverse Selection and Moral hazard in a Repeated Elections Models," RCER Working Papers 283, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- John Ferejohn, 1986. "Incumbent performance and electoral control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 50(1), pages 5-25, January.
- Zudenkova, Galina, 2011.
"A political agency model of coattail voting,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 95(11), pages 1652-1660.
- FRECHETTE, Guillaume R. & MANIQUET, François & MORELLI, Massimo, 2006.
"Incumbents’ interests, voters’ bias and gender quotas,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2006083, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Guillaume R., FRECHETTE & François, MANIQUET & Massimo, MORELLI, 2006. "Incumbents’ Interests, Voters’ Bias and Gender Quotas," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006042, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:29890. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.