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Equilibrium Party Government

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  • John W. Patty

Abstract

In this article, I present an equilibrium model of party government within a two‐party legislature. The theory is predicated upon members of the majority party having potentially conflicting individual and collective interests. In response to this potential conflict, the members of the majority party endogenously choose a degree of control to grant to their leadership. The equilibrium level of party strength is decreasing in the size of the majority party and increasing in the strength of opposition among members of the minority party. The theory implies that the average performance of W‐Nominate estimates of majority party members' ideal points will be a decreasing function of the size of the majority party while the performance of these estimates for members of the minority party will not be affected by the size of the majority party. Using data from the U.S. House and Senate between 1866 and 2004, the theory's predictions are largely consistent with roll‐call voting in both chambers.

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  • John W. Patty, 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 636-655, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:52:y:2008:i:3:p:636-655
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00334.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Zudenkova, Galina, 2011. "A Model of Party Discipline in a Congress," Working Papers 2072/151813, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
    2. Razvan Vlaicu, 2018. "Inequality, participation, and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(4), pages 597-624, April.
    3. Ryan J. Vander Wielen, 2023. "Party leaders as welfare-maximizing coalition builders in the pursuit of party-related public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 194(1), pages 75-99, January.
    4. Jon X. Eguia, 2013. "The Origin of Parties: The United States Congress in 1789–1797 as a Test Case," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(3), pages 313-334, November.
    5. Curto-Grau, Marta & Zudenkova, Galina, 2018. "Party discipline and government spending: Theory and evidence," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 139-152.
    6. Hande Mutlu-Eren, 2015. "Keeping the party together," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 164(1), pages 117-133, July.
    7. Zudenkova, Galina, 2012. "A rationale for intra-party democracy," MPRA Paper 39091, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Valerio Dotti, 2021. "Reaching across the aisle to block reforms," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(2), pages 533-578, September.
    9. Sean Gailmard & Jeffery A. Jenkins, 2009. "Agency Problems, the 17th Amendment, and Representation in the Senate," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(2), pages 324-342, April.
    10. Gerard Padró i Miquel & Erik Snowberg, 2012. "The lesser evil: Executive accountability with partisan supporters," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 24(1), pages 19-45, January.
    11. John Patty, 2010. "Dilatory or anticipatory? Voting on the Journal in the House of Representatives," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 143(1), pages 121-133, April.

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