IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/wlu/wpaper/eg0043.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents

Author

Abstract

We fix the status quo (Q) and one of the bilateral bargaining agents to examine how shifting the opponent.s ideal point (type) away from Q in a unidimensional space affects the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions when opponents differ only in their ideal points. The results are similar for both solutions. As anticipated, the bargainer whose ideal point is farthest from Q prefers a opponent whose ideal is closest to her own. A similar intuitive ranking emerges for the player closest to Q when opponent\'s preferences exhibit increasing absolute risk aversion. However, if the opponent\'s preferences exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), the player closest to Q prefers a more extreme opponent. This unintuitive result arises for opponents with DARA preferences because the farther their ideal point is from Q, the easier they are to satisfy.

Suggested Citation

  • Ross Cressman, Maria Gallego, 2005. "On the Ranking of Bilateral Bargaining Opponents," Working Papers eg0043, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
    • Handle: RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0043
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.wlu.ca/documents/7723/Cressman%2526Gallego_May_05.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Baron, David P. & Ferejohn, John A., 1989. "Bargaining in Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 83(4), pages 1181-1206, December.
    2. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    3. Alejandro Saporiti & Fernando Tohmé, 2006. "Single-Crossing, Strategic Voting and the Median Choice Rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(2), pages 363-383, April.
    4. Kalai, Ehud & Smorodinsky, Meir, 1975. "Other Solutions to Nash's Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(3), pages 513-518, May.
    5. Volij, Oscar & Winter, Eyal, 2002. "On risk aversion and bargaining outcomes," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 120-140, October.
    6. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
    7. Kobberling, Veronika & Peters, Hans, 2003. "The effect of decision weights in bargaining problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 154-175, May.
    8. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    9. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    10. Mas-Colell, Andreu & Whinston, Michael D. & Green, Jerry R., 1995. "Microeconomic Theory," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780195102680.
    11. Kannai, Yakar, 1977. "Concavifiability and constructions of concave utility functions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(1), pages 1-56, March.
    12. ,, 2002. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 193-194, February.
    13. Cressman, Ross & Gallego, Maria, 2009. "On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 64-83, July.
    14. Zinde-Walsh, Victoria, 1995. "ESTIMATION AND INFERENCE IN ECONOMETRICSRussell Davidson and James G. MacKinnon Oxford University Press, 1993," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 631-635, June.
    15. Thomson, William, 1994. "Cooperative models of bargaining," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 35, pages 1237-1284, Elsevier.
    16. Susan Athey, 2002. "Monotone Comparative Statics under Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 117(1), pages 187-223.
    17. Scott Ashworth & Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, 2006. "Monotone Comparative Statics for Models of Politics," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 50(1), pages 214-231, January.
    18. ,, 2002. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(2), pages 541-545, April.
    19. Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
    20. de Koster, R. & Peters, H. J. M. & Tijs, S. H. & Wakker, P., 1983. "Risk sensitivity, independence of irrelevant alternatives and continuity of bargaining solutions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 4(3), pages 295-300, July.
    21. Thomson, William, 1987. "Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 50-58, June.
    22. Hans Peters, 1992. "A Criterion for Comparing Strength of Preference with an Application to Bargaining," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 40(5), pages 1018-1022, October.
    23. ,, 2002. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(4), pages 1007-1017, August.
    24. Jansen, M.J.M. & Tijs, S.H., 1983. "Continuity of bargaining solutions," Other publications TiSEM 6c8fa22d-61f9-43b6-9224-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    25. Hans Peters & Walter Bossert, 2002. "Efficient solutions to bargaining problems with uncertain disagreement points," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 19(3), pages 489-502.
    26. ,, 2002. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(6), pages 1461-1465, December.
    27. ,, 2002. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(5), pages 1273-1289, October.
    28. Austen-Smith, David & Banks, Jeffrey, 1988. "Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(2), pages 405-422, June.
    29. ,, 2002. "Problems And Solutions," Econometric Theory, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(3), pages 819-821, June.
    30. Alvin E Roth, 2008. "Axiomatic Models of Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002376, David K. Levine.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
    2. Maria Gallego & David Scoones, 2011. "Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 591-610, April.
    3. Cressman, Ross & Gallego, Maria, 2009. "On the ranking of bilateral bargaining opponents," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 64-83, July.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2022. "Individual disagreement point concavity and the bargaining problem," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 18(1), pages 6-15, March.
    2. Maria Gallego, David Scoones, 2005. "The Art of Compromise," Working Papers eg0042, Wilfrid Laurier University, Department of Economics, revised 2005.
    3. Bossert, Walter & Derks, Jean & Peters, Hans, 2005. "Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 12-23, July.
    4. Amparo Mármol & Clara Ponsatí, 2008. "Bargaining over multiple issues with maximin and leximin preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(2), pages 211-223, February.
    5. Maria Gallego & David Scoones, 2011. "Intergovernmental negotiation, willingness to compromise, and voter preference reversals," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 36(3), pages 591-610, April.
    6. Claudia García-García & Catalina B. García-García & Román Salmerón, 2021. "Confronting collinearity in environmental regression models: evidence from world data," Statistical Methods & Applications, Springer;Società Italiana di Statistica, vol. 30(3), pages 895-926, September.
    7. Cambier, Adrien & Chardy, Matthieu & Figueiredo, Rosa & Ouorou, Adam & Poss, Michael, 2022. "Optimizing subscriber migrations for a telecommunication operator in uncertain context," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 298(1), pages 308-321.
    8. Libura, Marek, 2007. "On the adjustment problem for linear programs," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 183(1), pages 125-134, November.
    9. Christophe Loussouarn & Carine Franc & Yann Videau & Julien Mousquès, 2021. "Can General Practitioners Be More Productive? The Impact of Teamwork and Cooperation with Nurses on GP Activities," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 680-698, March.
    10. Tschakert, Petra, 2016. "Shifting Discourses of Vilification and the Taming of Unruly Mining Landscapes in Ghana," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 123-132.
    11. María-Consuelo Casabán & Rafael Company & Lucas Jódar, 2020. "Non-Gaussian Quadrature Integral Transform Solution of Parabolic Models with a Finite Degree of Randomness," Mathematics, MDPI, vol. 8(7), pages 1-16, July.
    12. Isabelle Boutron & Peter John & David J. Torgerson, 2010. "Reporting Methodological Items in Randomized Experiments in Political Science," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, , vol. 628(1), pages 112-131, March.
    13. Ben Slimane, Faten & Padilla Angulo, Laura, 2019. "Strategic change and corporate governance: Evidence from the stock exchange industry," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 206-218.
    14. Weijun Xie & Yanfeng Ouyang & Sze Chun Wong, 2016. "Reliable Location-Routing Design Under Probabilistic Facility Disruptions," Transportation Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(3), pages 1128-1138, August.
    15. Sin-Yu Ho & N.M. Odhiambo, 2018. "Analysing the macroeconomic drivers of stock market development in the Philippines," Cogent Economics & Finance, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 6(1), pages 1451265-145, January.
    16. Natalia Nikolaevna Natocheeva* & Yuri Alexandrovich Rovensky & Yuri Yuryevich Rusanov & Tatiana Viktorovna Belyanchikova & Anna Anatolevna Staurskaya, 2018. "Optimizing Variability of Approaches to Regulatory Financing of Higher Education Services," The Journal of Social Sciences Research, Academic Research Publishing Group, pages 221-227:3.
    17. Philip Arestis & Howard Stein, 2005. "An Institutional Perspective to Finance and Development as an Alternative to Financial Liberalisation," International Review of Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 381-398.
    18. Sahar Validi & Arijit Bhattacharya & P. J. Byrne, 2020. "Sustainable distribution system design: a two-phase DoE-guided meta-heuristic solution approach for a three-echelon bi-objective AHP-integrated location-routing model," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 290(1), pages 191-222, July.
    19. Cabada, Alberto & Fernández-Gómez, Carlos, 2015. "Constant sign solutions of two-point fourth order problems," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 263(C), pages 122-133.
    20. Andy Hall, 2005. "Capacity development for agricultural biotechnology in developing countries: an innovation systems view of what it is and how to develop it," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(5), pages 611-630.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory; Nash bargaining problems; bargaining solutions; rankings;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wlu:wpaper:eg0043. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Glen Stewart (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/sbwluca.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.