IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v47y2003i2p305-317.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000

Author

Listed:
  • Jason M. Roberts
  • Steven S. Smith

Abstract

In this article, we provide a critical review of the evidence and arguments about party polarization in the House of Representatives during the late 20th century. We show that inferences about party polarization are significantly affected by voting reform in the early 1970s. We observe that a decomposed roll‐call record alters our view of the timing of changes in party polarization and therefore requires that we reconsider explanations of the trend. We revisit explanations of party polarization and establish a strong case for placing substantial emphasis on party strategies in explanations of party polarization in floor behavior during the 1980s and 1990s.

Suggested Citation

  • Jason M. Roberts & Steven S. Smith, 2003. "Procedural Contexts, Party Strategy, and Conditional Party Voting in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1971–2000," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 47(2), pages 305-317, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:47:y:2003:i:2:p:305-317
    DOI: 10.1111/1540-5907.00021
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-5907.00021
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/1540-5907.00021?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Jackson, Matthew O. & Muller, Philippe & Tejada, Oriol, 2023. "Electoral competition with costly policy changes: A dynamic perspective," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 214(C).
    2. Ryan J. Vander Wielen & Michael J. Vander Wielen, 2020. "Unpacking the unknown: a method for identifying status quo distributions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 182(1), pages 49-72, January.
    3. Gersbach, Hans & Muller, Philippe & Tejada, Oriol, 2019. "Costs of change and political polarization," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    4. Gersbach, Hans & Jackson, Matthew O. & Tejada, Oriol, 2020. "The Optimal Length of Political Terms," CEPR Discussion Papers 14857, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. John W. Patty, 2008. "Equilibrium Party Government," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 52(3), pages 636-655, July.
    6. Clio Andris & David Lee & Marcus J Hamilton & Mauro Martino & Christian E Gunning & John Armistead Selden, 2015. "The Rise of Partisanship and Super-Cooperators in the U.S. House of Representatives," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 10(4), pages 1-14, April.
    7. Nolan McCarty & Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 2009. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 53(3), pages 666-680, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:47:y:2003:i:2:p:305-317. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.