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Vertical Competition in Unitary States: The Case of Italy

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  • Breton, Albert
  • Fraschini, Angela

Abstract

In unitary states--states in which constitutional powers are owned by the central government--vertical competition can generate stable outcomes, that is outcomes that do not unravel through arbitrary repossessions by the center. Stability is a product of institutional commitment devices. Through these a democratic government, though it cannot bind successor governments, can effectively oblige them to respect some of the decisions it has made. A number of such commitment devices exist in Italy; they make possible stable vertical competition between central and regional governments. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 114 (2003)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (January)
Pages: 57-77

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:114:y:2003:i:1-2:p:57-77

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Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100332

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Cited by:
  1. Zudenkova, Galina, 2010. "A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting," Working Papers 2072/151618, Universitat Rovira i Virgili, Department of Economics.
  2. Galina Zudenkova, 2010. "Split-ticket voting: an implicit incentive approach," Economics Working Papers we1011, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  3. Albert Breton & Angela Fraschini, 2003. "The Independence of the Italian Constitutional Court," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(4), pages 319-333, December.
  4. Albert Breton & Heinrich Ursprung, 2002. "Globalisation, Competitive Governments, and Constitutional Choice in Europe," CESifo Working Paper Series 657, CESifo Group Munich.
  5. Martin Bodenstein & Heinrich Ursprung, 2005. "Political yardstick competition, economic integration, and constitutional choice in a federation:," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(3), pages 329-352, September.
  6. Costa-Font, Joan & Tremosa-Balcells, Ramon, 2008. "Support for state opting out and stateless national identity in the Basque Country," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2464-2477, December.
  7. Michele Santoni & Francesco Zucchini, 2006. "Legislative output and the Constitutional Court in Italy," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 165-187, September.
  8. Joan Costa-Font & Ana Rico, 2006. "Vertical Competition in the Spanish National Health System (NHS)," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(3), pages 477-498, September.
  9. SALMON, Pierre, 2005. "Horizontal competition among governments," LEG - Document de travail - Economie 2005-02, LEG, Laboratoire d'Economie et de Gestion, CNRS, Université de Bourgogne.
  10. Joan Costa Font & Ramon Tremosa Balcells, 2006. "National Identity and the Preference for State Opting-Out in the Basque Country," Working Papers in Economics 151, Universitat de Barcelona. Espai de Recerca en Economia.
  11. Alberto Majocchi, 2008. "Theories of fiscal federalism and the European experience," ISAE Working Papers 100, ISTAT - Italian National Institute of Statistics - (Rome, ITALY).
  12. Pierre Salmon, 2013. "How significant is yardstick competition among governments? Three reasons to dig deeper," Working Papers hal-00830872, HAL.

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