Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics
AbstractThe paper analyses the interaction between economic incentives and work norms in the context of social insurance. If the work norm is endogenous in the sense that it is weaker when the population share of beneficiaries is higher, then voters will choose less generous benefits than otherwise. We also discuss welfare-state dynamics when there is a time lag in the adjustment of the norm in response to changes in this population share, and show how a temporary shift in the unemployment rate may cause persistence in the number of beneficiaries.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Research Institute of Industrial Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 585.
Length: 14 pages
Date of creation: 15 Nov 2002
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Journal of the European Economic Association 1, Papers and Proceedings, 2003, pages 533-542.
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Postal: Research Institute of Industrial Economics, Box 55665, SE-102 15 Stockholm, Sweden
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More information through EDIRC
Welfare State; Social Norms; Social Insurance;
Other versions of this item:
- D19 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Other
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2002-11-28 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2002-11-28 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-EVO-2002-11-28 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2002-11-28 (Public Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1990.
"Understanding Welfare Stigma: Taxpayer Resentment And Statistical Discrimination,"
42, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 165-183, July.
- Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2000. "Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State," Nordic Journal of Political Economy, Nordic Journal of Political Economy, vol. 26, pages 33-53.
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