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The Social Contract with Endogenous Sentiments Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Matteo Cervellati ()
Joan Esteban ()
Laurence Kranich ()
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Moral values influence individual behavior and social interactions. A specially significant instance is the case of moral values concerning work effort. Individuals determine what they take to be proper behaviour and judge the others, and themselves, accordingly. They increase their esteem -and self-esteem- for those who perform in excess of the standard and decrease their esteem for those who work less. These changes in self-esteem result from the self-regulatory emotions of guilt or pride extensively studied in Social Psychology. We examine the interactions between sentiments, individual behaviour and the social contract in a model of rational voting over redistribution where individual self-esteem and relative es-teem for others are endogenously determined. Individuals differ in their productivities. The desired extent of redistribution depends both on individual income and on individual attitudes toward others. We characterize the politico-economic equilibria in which s
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Paper provided by Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC) in its series UFAE and IAE Working Papers with number
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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2007Date of revision:
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Keywords: Social Contract ; Endogenous Sentiments ; Voting over Taxes ; Moral Work ; Other versions of this item:
Find related papers by JEL classification: D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
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references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Bénabou, Roland, 2008.
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