Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State

This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data

Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State

Author Info

Samuel Bowles
Herbert Gintis

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Herbert Gintis

Abstract

In the advanced economies, a substantial fraction of total income is regularly transferred from the better off to the less well off, with the approval of the electorate. Economists have for the most part misunderstood this phenomenon due to their endorsement of an empirically implausible theory of selfish human motivation. Understanding why citizens regularly vote for parties endorsing redistributive policies requires a reconsideration of the behavioral assumptions of economics. We find that voters support the welfare state because it conforms to deeply held norms of reciprocity and conditional obligations to others.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Nordic Journal of Political Economy in its journal Nordic Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 26 (2000)
Issue (Month): ()
Pages: 33-53
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:noj:journl:v:26:y:2000:p:33-53

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.nopecjournal.org

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Halvor Mehlum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D30 - Microeconomics - - Distribution - - - General
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
I30 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare and Poverty - - - General

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Lindbeck, Assar & Nyberg, Sten & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," Working Paper Series 585, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Joerg Weibull, 2003. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
- Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jörgen W. Weibull, 2003. "Social Norms and Welfare State Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(2-3), pages 533-542, 04/05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gaechter, 2006. "Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods," Discussion Papers 2006-01, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, 2005. "Heterogeneous social preferences and the dynamics of free riding in public goods," IEW - Working Papers iewwp261, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Urs Fischbacher & Simon Gächter, 2006. "Heterogeneous Social Preferences and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods," IZA Discussion Papers 2011, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
Ernst Fehr & Klaus Schmidt, 2000. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity -- Evidence and Economic Applications," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," IEW - Working Papers iewwp075, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity - Evidence and Economic Applications," CEPR Discussion Papers 2703, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 1999. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," Working Papers 9902, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Erzo F.P. Luttmer, 1999. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," JCPR Working Papers 61, Northwestern University/University of Chicago Joint Center for Poverty Research.
- Erzo F. P. Luttmer, 2001. "Group Loyalty and the Taste for Redistribution," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 109(3), pages 500-528, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Cappelen, Alexander W. & Tungodden, Bertil, 2004. "The liberal egalitarian paradox," Memorandum 14/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Jo Thori Lind, 2003. "Fractionalization and the Size of Government," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Lind, Jo Thori, 2003. "Fractionalization and the size of government," Memorandum 21/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Lind, Jo Thori, 2007. "Fractionalization and the size of government," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 51-76, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Christina M. Fong, 2003. "Emphatic Responsiveness: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment on Giving to Welfare Recipients," Framed Field Experiments 0026, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
Barth, Erling & Cappelen, Alexander W. & Ognedal, Tone, 2006. "Fair Tax Evasion," Memorandum 07/2006, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Papers 66, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2005. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism – Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Discussion Papers in Economics 726, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2006. "The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-27.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.