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Competitive Markets, Collective Decisions and Group Formation

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  • Hans Gersbach

    (University of Heidelberg)

  • Hans Haller

    (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University)

Abstract

We consider a general equilibrium model where households operating in a competitive market environment can have several members and make efficient collective consumption decisions. Individuals have the option to leave the household and make it on their own or join another household. We study the effect of these outside options on household formation, household stability, equilibrium existence, and equilibrium efficiency.

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File URL: http://www.econ.ku.dk/english/research/publications/wp/2002/0211.pdf/
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics in its series Discussion Papers with number 02-11.

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Length: 54 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:kud:kuiedp:0211

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Related research

Keywords: household behavior; household formation; collective decision making; general equilibrium;

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References

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  1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2004. "When Inefficiency Begets Efficiency," CESifo Working Paper Series 1197, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Ellickson, Bryan & Grodal, Birgit & Scotchmer, Suzanne & Zame, William R., 2001. "Clubs and the Market: Large Finite Economies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(1), pages 40-77, November.
  3. Bennett, Elaine, 1988. "Consistent bargaining conjectures in marriage and matching," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 392-407, August.
  4. Bennett, Elaine, 1997. "Multilateral Bargaining Problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(2), pages 151-179, May.
  5. Martine Quinzii, 1982. "Core and Competitive Equilibria with Indivisibilities," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 644, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  6. Crawford, Vincent P & Rochford, Sharon C, 1986. "Bargaining and Competition in Matching Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(2), pages 329-48, June.
  7. Bogomolnaia, Anna & Jackson, Matthew O., 2002. "The Stability of Hedonic Coalition Structures," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 201-230, February.
  8. Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R Zame, 2003. "Clubs and the Market," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000754, David K. Levine.
    • Bryan Ellickson & Birgit Grodal & Suzanne Scotchmer & William R. Zame, 1999. "Clubs and the Market," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1185-1218, September.
  9. Pierre-André Chiappori & Bernard Fortin & Guy Lacroix, 2001. "Marriage Market, Divorce Legislation and Household Labor Supply," CIRANO Working Papers 2001s-16, CIRANO.
  10. Jehiel, Philippe & Scotchmer, Suzanne, 2001. "Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 393-413, April.
  11. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2001. "Collective Decisions and Competitive Markets," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(2), pages 347-68, April.
  12. Chiappori, P.A., 1989. "Collective Labour Supply and Welfare," DELTA Working Papers 89-07, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  13. Rochford, Sharon C., 1984. "Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 262-281, December.
  14. Tayfun Sönmez & Suryapratim Banerjee & Hideo Konishi, 2001. "Core in a simple coalition formation game," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 135-153.
  15. Dreze, J H & Greenberg, J, 1980. "Hedonic Coalitions: Optimality and Stability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 987-1003, May.
  16. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre, 1988. "Rational Household Labor Supply," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(1), pages 63-90, January.
  17. Alkan, Ahmet, 1988. "Nonexistence of stable threesome matchings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 207-209, October.
  18. Haller, Hans, 2000. "Household Decisions and Equilibrium Efficiency," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 41(4), pages 835-47, November.
  19. Alkan, Ahmet & Gale, David, 1990. "The core of the matching game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 203-212, September.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2005. "When inefficiency begets efficiency," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(1), pages 105-121, 01.
  2. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2009. "Bargaining power and equilibrium consumption," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 33(4), pages 665-690, November.
  3. Michele Gori & Antonio Villanacci, 2011. "A bargaining model in general equilibrium," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 46(3), pages 327-375, April.
  4. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2010. "Club theory and household formation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 715-724, September.
  5. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2008. "Exit and Power in General Equilibrium," CESifo Working Paper Series 2369, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2011. "General Equilibrium with Multi-Member Households and Production," CESifo Working Paper Series 3659, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2010. "Bargaining cum Voice," CEPR Discussion Papers 7774, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  8. Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2006. "Voice and Bargaining Power," CESifo Working Paper Series 1668, CESifo Group Munich.

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