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Resisting Globalization: Voting Power Indices and the National Interest in the EU Decision-making

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Author Info
Elisabetta Croci Angelini (Università di Macerata)

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Abstract

The European integration process can be regarded as an aspect of the overall process of globalization and at the same time as an attempt to reconcile the move towards standardization with the defence of national diversity. A central role in the effort to exploit the benefits of integration without hampering the national nterest is the collective decision-making process in the EU shared by the Council and the Parliament, where national representatives struggle for the conquest of the ”lion’s share” in the division of the surplus stemming from the compromise on common policies. The paper focuses on the rationale behind the various Indices of Voting Power (Penrose, Banzhaf, Shapley and Shubik, Holler) which are the formal tools meant to understanding the coalition formation and assessing the probability of reaching an agreement. In the EU Council, although ministers tend to reach a broad consensus and explicit voting is rare, decision may be taken by qualified majority voting where countries are assigned weights reflecting their size. This practice has often been objected on the grounds that the potential emergence of permanent coalitions would prevent countries from being adequately represented, and eventually a different rule was proposed. The pros and cons of the newly proposed system are analysed through the computation of the Indices of Voting Power for the EU Council and Parliament.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Macerata University, Department of Studies on Economic Development (DiSSE) in its series Working Papers with number 08-2007.

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Date of creation: May 2007
Date of revision: Feb 2009
Publication status: Published in “Globalization, Development and Integration A European Perspective†Della Posta P., Uvalic M., Verdun A. (eds.) Palgrave MacMillan 2009 pp.247-258
Handle: RePEc:mcr:wpaper:wpaper00008

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Related research
Keywords: cooperative games; I-power; voting power; European integration; swing; P-power; Power indices;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
O11 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Macroeconomic Analyses of Economic Development

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Pierre Salmon, 2003. "The Assignment of Powers in an Open-ended European Union," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  2. Laruelle, Annick & Widgrén, Mika, 1996. "Is the Allocation of Voting Power Among the EU States Fair?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1402, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Federico Valenciano & Annick Laruelle & Ricardo Martínez, 2004. "Success Versus Decisiveness: Conceptual Discussion And Case Study," Working Papers. Serie AD 2004-30, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
  4. Widgren, Mika, 1994. "Voting power in the EC decision making and the consequences of two different enlargements," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 38(5), pages 1153-1170, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Laruelle, Annick & Widgren, Mika, 1998. " Is the Allocation of Voting Power among EU States Fair?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3-4), pages 317-39, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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