Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium in Sealed High Bid Auctions
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Working Papers with number 407.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 1986
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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/
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- Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
447R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Maskin, Eric S & Riley, John G, 1984.
"Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,"
Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1473-1518, November.
- Fernando Branco, 1996. "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 283-309, December.
- Lambrecht, Bart & Perraudin, William, 2003. "Real options and preemption under incomplete information," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 619-643, February.
- Lamping, Jennifer, 2007. "The Value of Information in Auctions with Default Risk," MPRA Paper 24375, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "Ignorance Is Bliss: Matching in Auctions with an Uninformed Seller," MPRA Paper 24374, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Gustavo Rodríguez, 1997. "First price auctions: Monotonicity and uniqueness," Economics Working Papers 208, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
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