Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Tax Competition, Imperfect Capital Mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kaushal Kishore

    ()
    (Southern Methodist University)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    The gain to competing governments from entering into binding non-preferential tax agree- ments (that prevents discriminatory taxation in favor of mobile capital) depends on the extent of capital mobility between jurisdictions. In particular the gain is increasing in the cost of re- location of capital and the fraction of the domestic tax base which is relatively immobile. We show this in a symmetric model of capital tax competition between two governments where all capital is imperfectly mobile and di¤er only in their cost of relocation.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: ftp://ftp1.economics.smu.edu/WorkingPapers/2008/Kishore/Kishore-2008-07.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 0804.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Jul 2008
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:smu:ecowpa:0804

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Department of Economics, P.O. Box 750496, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX 75275-0496
    Phone: 214-768-2715
    Fax: 214-768-1821
    Web page: http://www.smu.edu/economics

    Related research

    Keywords: Tax Competition; Capital Mobility; Non-Preferential Regime.;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Janeba, Eckhard & Peters, Wolfgang, 1999. "Tax Evasion, Tax Competition and the Gains from Nondiscrimination: The Case of Interest Taxation in Europe," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(452), pages 93-101, January.
    2. Butters, Gerard R, 1977. "Equilibrium Distributions of Sales and Advertising Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(3), pages 465-91, October.
    3. Dasgupta, Partha & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Existence of Equilibrium in Discontinuous Economic Games, I: Theory," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(1), pages 1-26, January.
    4. Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 2002. "Agglomeration, Integration and Tax Harmonization," NBER Working Papers 9290, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Deneckere, Raymond J & Kovenock, Dan & Lee, Robert, 1992. "A Model of Price Leadership Based on Consumer Loyalty," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 40(2), pages 147-56, June.
    6. Peralta, Susana & van Ypersele, Tanguy, 2005. "Factor endowments and welfare levels in an asymmetric tax competition game," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 258-274, March.
    7. Haupt, Alexander & Peters, Wolfgang, 2005. "Restricting preferential tax regimes to avoid harmful tax competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(5), pages 493-507, September.
    8. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen, 1991. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination when Countries Differ in Size," Working Papers 819, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    9. Narasimhan, Chakravarthi, 1988. "Competitive Promotional Strategies," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61(4), pages 427-49, October.
    10. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2007. "Preferential tax regimes with asymmetric countries," Munich Reprints in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics 19976, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    11. Janeba, Eckhard & Smart, Michael, 2003. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 10(3), pages 259-80, May.
    12. Jeremy Edwards & Michael Keen, 1994. "Tax competition and Leviathon," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W94/07, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
    13. Varian, Hal R, 1980. "A Model of Sales," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 70(4), pages 651-59, September.
    14. Kind, Hans Jarle & Schjelderup, Guttorm & Ulltveit-Moe, Karen-Helene, 1999. "Competing for Capital in a 'Lumpy' World," CEPR Discussion Papers 2188, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
    16. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2003. "Agglomeration Effects and the Competition for Firms," Cahiers de recherche 0324, CIRPEE.
    17. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain & John D. Wilson, 2007. "Why Do Most Countries Set High Tax Rates on Capital?," Cahiers de recherche 0711, CIRPEE.
    18. Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On the Existence of Pure and Mixed Strategy Nash Equilibria in Discontinuous Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1029-1056, September.
    19. Wang, Xuejun, 2004. "Tax evasion, tax competition and gains from nondiscrimination with equilibrium mixed strategies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 83(3), pages 377-381, June.
    20. Keen, Michael, 2001. "Preferential Regimes Can Make Tax Competition Less Harmful," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 54(n. 4), pages 757-62, December.
    21. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
    22. Rosenthal, Robert W, 1980. "A Model in Which an Increase in the Number of Sellers Leads to a Higher Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 48(6), pages 1575-79, September.
    23. Shilony, Yuval, 1977. "Mixed pricing in oligopoly," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 373-388, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:smu:ecowpa:0804. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bo Chen).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.