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Competition for FDI with vintage investment and agglomeration advantages

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  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Kovenock, Dan

Abstract

Countries compete for new FDI investment, whereas stocks of FDI generate agglomeration benefits and are potentially subject to extortionary taxation. We study the interaction between these aspects in a simple vintage capital framework with discrete time and infinite horizon, focussing on Markov perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies. We show that the tax revenue in the equilibrium is substantial, and higher on “old FDI than on new FDI, even though countries are not allowed to use discriminatory taxation. Moreover, the agglomeration advantage is valuable, but is exploited in the short run and can be unstable over time. -- Länder konkurrieren um den aktuellen Strom ausländischer Direktinvestitionen. Der Bestand an Direktinvestitionen, die sich in einem Land angesammelt haben, hat Agglomerationsgewinne und seine Besteuerung erlaubt es, fiskalische Einnahmen zu erzielen. Die Interaktion zwischen diesen Aspekten wird in einem einfachen formalen Rahmen analysiert. Wesentliche Charakteristika der formalen Analyse sind diskrete Zeitperioden, ein unendlicher Zeithorizont und Investitionen, die zum Investitionszeitpunkt mobil sind, nach erfolgter Investition immobil sind und über mehrere Perioden abschreiben. Betrachtet werden Markov-perfekte Gleichgewichte. Die Möglichkeit der Besteuerung von ausländischen Direktinvestitionen kann im Gleichgewicht Agglomerationsvorteile solcher Investitionen destabilisieren. Die Agglomeration von Kapital ist wertvoll für das Land, in dem sie erfolgt ist. Die Vorteile werden aber kurzfristig ausgeschöpft. Das Gleichgewicht weist ein erhebliches Steueraufkommen auf. Dabei werden indirekt „alte“ steuerlich höher als „neue“ ausländische Direktinvestitionen belastet, obwohl den Ländern die diskriminierende Besteuerung untersagt wird. Zudem wird die Rolle von Subventionen und finanziellen Ansiedlungsanreizen behandelt. Die Möglichkeit, finanzielle Anreize für neue Investitionen zu geben, kann vorhandene Agglomerationsvorteile festigen, kann aber das Steueraufkommen im Gleichgewicht reduzieren.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB) in its series Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance with number SP II 2008-09.

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Date of creation: 2008
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:wzbmpg:spii200809

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Keywords: Dynamic tax competition; vintage capital; agglomeration; foreign direct investment; bidding for firms;

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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hyun-Ju Koh & Nadine Riedel, 2010. "Do Governments Tax Agglomeration Rents?," Working Papers 1004, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
  2. Marceau, Nicolas & Mongrain, Steeve, 2011. "Competition in law enforcement and capital allocation," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 136-147, January.
  3. Fatica, Serena, 2009. "Taxation and the quality of institutions: asymmetric effects on FDI," MPRA Paper 24179, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jun 2010.
  4. Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger, 2009. "The role of mobility in tax and subsidy competition," Working Papers 21, University of Paderborn, CIE Center for International Economics.
  5. Giorgio Barba Navaretti & Anthony J. Venables, 2013. "Multinationals and Industrial Policy," Development Working Papers 352, Centro Studi Luca d\'Agliano, University of Milano, revised 24 Apr 2013.
  6. Elsayyad, May & Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Fighting Multiple Tax Havens," Munich Reprints in Economics 13964, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
  7. Elsayyad, May & Konrad, Kai A., 2012. "Fighting multiple tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 86(2), pages 295-305.
  8. Steeve Mongrain & John D. Wilson, 2011. "Tax competition with heterogeneous capital mobility," Working Papers 2011/25, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  9. Michael Keen & Kai A. Konrad, 2012. "International Tax Competition and Coordination," Working Papers international_tax_competi, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.

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