A two-region economy consists of a given but different number of immobile workers in each region, and a given number of mobile firms. Firms create jobs where they locate, but there is frictional unemployment. Two sorts of agglomeration effects arise: those from economies of scale in matching, and those from production economies external to the firm. Regions may either be part of a unitary state in which case all regional policies are decided by the central government, or they may be part of a federal state in which case some policies are determined by the regional governments. We characterize the resource allocations in both a unitary and a federal state, and identify the set of instruments that are required to replicate the social optimum in each state.
Download Info
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: Aug 2002 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2002-08
Contact details of provider:
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().
Related research
Keywords:
Find related papers by JEL classification: H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - General R30 - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics - - Production Analysis and Firm Location - - - General
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2002.
"Inter-Jurisdictional Competition for Firms,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 43(3), pages 761-782, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)