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Capital Tax Competition and Returns to Scale

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  • John Burbidge

    (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo)

  • Katherine Cuff

    (Department of Economics, McMaster University)

Abstract

That some capital importing regions subsidize units of capital is inconsistent with the standard models of the capital tax competition literature. We maintain the assumption of capital homogeneity and relax the assumption of constant returns to scale. Among other things, we show that symmetric regions in a Nash equilibrium may subsidize capital as may a capital importing region in an asymmetric Nash equilibrium. We also prove that any ine.ciencies in asymmetric Nash equilibria with both capital and head taxes arise entirely from regions’ incentives to manipulate the terms of trade, and not from increasing returns. We also show the result that small regions win tax competitions in Nash equilibria with capital taxes only may not hold with increasing returns.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Waterloo, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 03002.

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Date of creation: Aug 2002
Date of revision: Sep 2003
Handle: RePEc:wat:wpaper:03002

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References

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  1. Wilson, J.D., 1990. "Tax Competition With Interregional Differences In Factor Endowments," Working Papers 4, John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy.
  2. Wilson, John Douglas, 1999. "Theories of Tax Competition," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 52(n. 2), pages 269-304, June.
  3. Teresa Garcia-Milà & Therese J. McGuire, 2001. "Tax incentives and the city," Economics Working Papers 631, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 2001.
  4. Bucovetsky, S., 1991. "Asymmetric tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 167-181, September.
  5. Paul Krugman, 1990. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography," NBER Working Papers 3275, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Bond, Eric W & Samuelson, Larry, 1986. "Tax Holidays as Signals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 820-26, September.
  7. WILDASIN, David, . "Nash equilibria in models of fiscal competition," CORE Discussion Papers RP -804, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  8. Robin Boadway & Katherine Cuff & Nicolas Marceau, 2003. "Agglomeration Effects and the Competition for Firms," Cahiers de recherche 0324, CIRPEE.
  9. John Burbidge & Katherine Cuff, 2002. "Capital Tax Competition and Returns to Scale," Department of Economics Working Papers 2002-10, McMaster University.
  10. Eckhard Janeba & Michael Smart, 2001. "Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?," CESifo Working Paper Series 590, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Hans Jarle Kind & Helene Midelfart & Guttorm Schjelderup, 2000. "Competing for Capital in a "Lumpy" World," CESifo Working Paper Series 252, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Wilson, John D., 1986. "A theory of interregional tax competition," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 296-315, May.
  13. Black, Dan A & Hoyt, William H, 1989. "Bidding for Firms," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(5), pages 1249-56, December.
  14. Fujita, Masahisa & Thisse, Jacques-François, 1996. "Economics of Agglomeration," CEPR Discussion Papers 1344, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  15. Ben Lockwood, 2004. "Competition in Unit vs. Ad Valorem Taxes," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 11(6), pages 763-772, November.
  16. Ludema, Rodney D. & Wooton, Ian, 2000. "Economic geography and the fiscal effects of regional integration," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 331-357, December.
  17. John B. Burbidge & James A. DePater & Gordon M. Myers & Abhijit Sengupta, 1996. "A Coalition-formation Approach to Equilibrium Federations and Trading Block s," Department of Economics Working Papers 1996-05, McMaster University.
  18. Scoones, David & Wen, Jean-Francois, 2001. " Common and Private Values of the Firm in Tax Competition," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 373-89.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Burbidge, John & Cuff, Katherine, 2005. "Capital tax competition and returns to scale," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(4), pages 353-373, July.
  2. Han, Yutao & Pieretti, Patrice & Zou, Benteng, 2014. "Does size asymmetry exacerbate the inefficiency of tax competition?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 16-18.
  3. Matthias Wrede, 2008. "Agglomeration, tax competition, and fiscal equalization," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200818, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
  4. Yutao Han, 2013. "Who benefits from partial tax coordination?," CREA Discussion Paper Series 13-24, Center for Research in Economic Analysis, University of Luxembourg.
  5. Boadway, Robin & Tremblay, Jean-François, 2012. "Reassessment of the Tiebout model," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(11), pages 1063-1078.
  6. Matthias Wrede, 2014. "Asymmetric tax competition with formula apportionment," Letters in Spatial and Resource Sciences, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 47-60, March.
  7. Fernandez, Gonzalo E., 2005. "A note on tax competition in the presence of agglomeration economies," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 837-847, November.
  8. Jordi Jofre-Monseny, 2010. "Is agglomeration taxable?," Working Papers 2010/15, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  9. Marius BRÜLHART & Mario JAMETTI & Kurt SCHMIDHEINY, 2007. "Do Agglomeration Economies Reduce the Sensitivity of Firm Location to Tax Differentials?," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 07.13, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
  10. Alexei Alexandrov & Özlem Bedre-Defolie, 2011. "Sales tax competition and a multinational with a decreasing marginal cost," ESMT Research Working Papers ESMT-11-01, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
  11. Till Gross, 2013. "Capital Tax Competition and Dynamic Optimal Taxation," Carleton Economic Papers 13-08, Carleton University, Department of Economics.
  12. Luca Barone, 2013. "An ABM for Economics: Micro Explains Macro," Working papers 016, Department of Economics and Statistics (Dipartimento di Scienze Economico-Sociali e Matematico-Statistiche), University of Torino.
  13. John Burbidge & Katherine Cuff & John Leach, 2004. "Capital Tax Competition with Heterogeneous Firms and Agglomeration Effects (new title: Tax competition with heterogeneous firms)," CESifo Working Paper Series 1277, CESifo Group Munich.
  14. Jofre-Monseny, Jordi & Solé-Ollé, Albert, 2012. "Which communities should be afraid of mobility? The effects of agglomeration economies on the sensitivity of employment location to local taxes," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 257-268.

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