This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful Than Its Remedies?

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Janeba, Eckhard
Smart, Michael

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Some governments have recently called for international accords restricting the use of preferential taxes targeted to attract mobile tax bases from abroad. Are such agreements likely to discourage tax competition or conversely cause it to spread? We study a general model of competition for multiple tax bases and establish conditions for a restriction on preferential regimes to increase or decrease tax revenues. Our results show that restrictions are most likely to be desirable when tax bases are on average highly responsive to a coordinated increase in tax rates by all governments, and when tax bases with large domestic elasticities are also more mobile internationally. Our analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently contradictory results of the previous literature. Copyright 2003 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0927-5940/contents
File Format: text/html
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Springer in its journal International Tax and Public Finance.

Volume (Year): 10 (2003)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 259-80
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:kap:itaxpf:v:10:y:2003:i:3:p:259-80

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=102915

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Peter Birch Sørensen, 2000. "The case for international tax co-ordination reconsidered," Economic Policy, CEPR, CES, MSH, vol. 15(31), pages 429-472, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Kanbur, Ravi & Keen, Michael, 1993. "Jeux Sans Frontieres: Tax Competition and Tax Coordination When Countries Differ in Size," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(4), pages 877-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Dhillon, Amrita & Perroni, Carlo & Scharf, Kimberley A., 1999. "Implementing tax coordination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 243-268, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Holmes, Thomas J, 1989. "The Effects of Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(1), pages 244-50, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Ralph A. Winter, 1997. "Colluding on Relative Prices," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 359-371, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Haufler, Andreas, 2006. "Die Besteuerung multinationaler Unternehmen," Discussion Papers in Economics 1153, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Bucovetsky, Sam & Haufler, Andreas, 2006. "Preferential tax regimes with asymmetric countries," Discussion Papers in Economics 1209, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Schreiber, Ulrich & Overesch, Michael & Büttner, Thiess & Wamser, Georg, 2006. "The Impact of Thin-Capitalization Rules on Multinationals? Financing and Investment Decisions," ZEW Discussion Papers 06-68, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Eggert, Wolfgang & Haufler, Andreas, 2006. "Company tax coordination cum tax rate competition in the European Union," Discussion Papers in Economics 902, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Sam Bucovetsky & Andreas Haufler, 2005. "Tax Competition when Firms Choose their Organizational Form: Should Tax Loopholes for Multinationals be Closed?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Andreas Haufler & Marco Runkel, 2008. "Firms' financial choices and thin capitalization rules under corporate tax competition," Working Papers 0815, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Jack Mintz, 2004. "Corporate Tax Harmonization in Europe: It's All About Compliance," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 221-234, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Alexander Klemm, 2009. "Causes, Benefits, and Risks of Business Tax Incentives," IMF Working Papers 09/21, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  9. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 81-110, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Keen, M. & Ligthart, J.E., 2004. "Information sharing and international taxation," Discussion Paper 117, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  11. Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain & John D. Wilson, 2007. "Why Do Most Countries Set Higher Tax Rates on Capital?," Discussion Papers dp07-09, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Thierry Warin & André Fourçans, 2006. "Tax Competition and Information Sharing in Europe: A Signaling Game," Middlebury College Working Paper Series 0605, Middlebury College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  13. Andreas Haufler, 2007. "Sollen multinationale Unternehmen weniger Steuern bezahlen?," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 76(2), pages 8-20. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Peter Egger & Wolfgang Eggert & Hannes Winner, 2007. "Saving Taxes Through Foreign Plant Ownership," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  15. Christoph Sauer & Margit Schratzenstaller, 2002. "Strategies Of International Fiscal Competition For Foreign Direct Investment In A Model With Impure Public Inputs," Departmental Discussion Papers 115, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  16. Kaushal Kishore, 2008. "Tax Competition, Imperfect Capital Mobility and the gain from non-preferential agreements," Departmental Working Papers 0804, Southern Methodist University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  17. Joel Slemrod & John D. Wilson, 2006. "Tax Competition With Parasitic Tax Havens," NBER Working Papers 12225, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Alexander Haupt & Tim Krieger, 2009. "The Role of Mobility in Tax and Subsidy Competition," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  19. Joeri Gorter & Khaled Moussa Diaw, . "The remedy may be worse than the disease: A critical account of The Code of Conduct," CPB Discussion Papers 5, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Over 80% of the top 1000 economists are registered on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.