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Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment

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Author Info
Maurice Kugler
Thierry Verdier
Yves Zenou

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Abstract

We analyze an oligopoly model in which differentiated criminal organizations globally compete on criminal activities and engage in local corruption to avoid punishment. When law enforcers are sufficiently well-paid, difficult to bribe and corruption detection highly probable, we show that increasing policing or sanctions effectively deters crime. However, when bribing costs are low, that is badly-paid and dishonest law enforcers work in a weak governance environment, and the rents from criminal activity relative to legal activity are sufficiently high, we find that increasing policing and sanctions can generate higher crime rates. In particular, the relationship between the traditional instruments of deterrence, namely intensification of policing and increment of sanctions, and crime is nonmonotonic. Beyond a threshold, increases in expected punishment induce organized crime to corruption, and ensuing impunity leads to higher rather than lower crime.

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Paper provided by DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) in its series DELTA Working Papers with number 2003-34.

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Date of creation: 2003
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Handle: RePEc:del:abcdef:2003-34

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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Basu, Kaushik & Bhattacharya, Sudipto & Mishra, Ajit, 1992. "Notes on bribery and the control of corruption," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 349-359, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," NBER Working Papers 6945, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1992. "Monitoring vis-a-vis Investigation in Enforcement of Law," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(3), pages 556-65, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Fender, John, 1999. "A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 437-453, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2003. "Organized Crime, Corruption and Punishment," Working Paper Series 600, Research Institute of Industrial Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Steven C. Salop, 1979. "Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 141-156, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Marjit, Sugata & Shi, Heling, 1998. "On controlling crime with corrupt officials," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 163-172, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Lucas, Robert Jr, 1976. "Econometric policy evaluation: A critique," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 1, pages 19-46. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Besley, Timothy & McLaren, John, 1993. "Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(416), pages 119-41, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Abdalla Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2001. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 138, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
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  15. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Juvenile Crime and Punishment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1156-1185, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  17. Kugler, M. & Rosenthal, H., 2000. "Checks and Balances: An Assessment of the Institutional Separation of Political Powers in Colombia," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0018, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
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  18. Garoupa, Nuno & Jellal, Mohamed, 2002. "Information, Corruption and Optimal Law Enforcement," CEPR Discussion Papers 3560, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bowles, Roger & Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 75-87, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Arun S. Malik, 1990. "Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 21(3), pages 341-353, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Yang, C. C., 2000. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 35-51, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  22. Sebastien Steinmetz & Yves Zenou, 2001. "On the Existence of Spatial Monopolies Under Free Entry," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 4, pages 1-10. [Downloadable!]
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  23. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-95, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Svetlana Andrianova & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Corruption, Extortion, and the Boundaries of the Law," Working Papers 0605, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM. [Downloadable!]
  2. Paolo Buonanno & Daniel Montolio & Paolo Vanin, 2006. "Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?," "Marco Fanno" Working Papers 0029, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche "Marco Fanno". [Downloadable!]
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  3. Pedro H. Albuquerque, 2005. "Shared Legacies, Disparate Outcomes: Why American South Border Cities Turned the Tables on Crime and Their Mexican Sisters Did Not," Law and Economics 0511002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. Hakkala, Katariina & Norbäck, Pehr-Johan & Svaleryd, Helena, 2005. "Asymmetric Effects of Corruption on FDI: Evidence from Swedish Multinational Firms," Working Paper Series 641, Research Institute of Industrial Economics, revised 20 Aug 2007. [Downloadable!]
  5. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2004. "Organised Crime, Corruption and Punishment," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0407, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton. [Downloadable!]
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