Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy
AbstractWe investigate the deterrent effect on driving behavior due to the introduction of Demerit Point System in Italy. In addition, we measure the incapacitation effect on fatal accidents. Our findings highlight the high potential of the penalty system in reducing road fatalities through deterrence and incapacitation. Despite this, its aggregate effectiveness in Italy ultimately depended on the consistency of the enforcement design. We then suggest several policy options to increase road safety through a credible enforcement.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 564.
Date of creation: Aug 2009
Date of revision:
deterrence; incapacitation; law enforcement; road safety;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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