Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Dissuader le crime : un survol

Contents:

Author Info

  • Marceau, Nicolas

    (Département des sciences économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal)

  • Mongrain, Steeve

    (Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University)

Abstract

In the last thirty years, economists have been applying their tools and methods to the study of crime deterrence. In this paper, we review their most important contributions. Depuis une trentaine d'années, les économistes ont appliqué leurs outils et leurs méthodes au problème de la dissuasion du crime. Dans ce texte, nous présentons une revue de leurs principales contributions.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://id.erudit.org/iderudit/602287ar
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Société Canadienne de Science Economique in its journal L'Actualité économique.

Volume (Year): 75 (1999)
Issue (Month): 1 (mars-juin-septembre)
Pages: 123-147

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:75:y:1999:i:1:p:123-147

Contact details of provider:
Email:
Web page: http://www.scse.ca/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Marcel Boyer & Tracy Lewis & Wei Lin Liu, 1996. "Setting Standards for Credible Compliance and Law Enforcement," CIRANO Working Papers 96s-27, CIRANO.
  2. Boadway, R. & Marceau, N. & Marchand, M., 1993. "Time-Consistent Criminal Sanctions," Papers 9318, Laval - Recherche en Politique Economique.
  3. Steven Shavell, 1989. "Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 3062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Reinganum, Jennifer F, 1988. "Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(4), pages 713-28, September.
  5. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1975. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 397-417, June.
  6. Daron Acemoglu, 1993. "Reward Structures and the Allocation of Talent," CEP Discussion Papers dp0143, Centre for Economic Performance, LSE.
  7. Mongrain, Steeve & Roberts, Joanne, 2009. "Plea bargaining with budgetary constraints," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 8-12, March.
  8. Nicolas Marceau, 1997. "Competition in Crime Deterrence," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 30(4), pages 844-54, November.
  9. Kaplow, Louis, 1990. "A note on the optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 245-247, July.
  10. Dan Usher, 1993. "Education as a Deterrent to Crime," Working Papers 870, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
  11. Steven D. Levitt, 1995. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Policeon Crime," NBER Working Papers 4991, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Usher, D, 1987. "Theft as a Paradigm for Departures from Efficiency," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 235-52, June.
  13. Edward L. Glaeser & Bruce Sacerdote & Jose A. Scheinkman, 1995. "Crime and Social Interactions," NBER Working Papers 5026, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  14. Shavell, Steven, 1987. "The Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(4), pages 584-92, September.
  15. PESTIEAU, Pierre & POSSEN, Uri M. & LUTSKY, Steven M., . "Jointly optimal taxes and enforcement policies in response to tax evasion," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1710, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  16. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169.
  17. Andreoni, James, 1991. "The desirability of a permanent tax amnesty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 143-159, July.
  18. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Kaplow, Louis, 1992. "Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Imperfectly Informed about the Probability of Apprehension," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 365-70, June.
  19. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
  20. Chu, C. Y. Cyrus & Jiang, Neville, 1993. "Are fines more efficient than imprisonment?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(3), pages 391-413, July.
  21. Sah, R.K., 1990. "Social Osmosis And Patterns Of Crime: A Dynamic Economic Analysis," Papers 609, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
  22. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1982. "The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprisonment," NBER Working Papers 0932, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  23. Frank A. Cowell, 1990. "Cheating the Government: The Economics of Evasion," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262532484, December.
  24. Dominique Demougin & Stephane Pallage, 1999. "Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior," Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM 9907, Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques.
  25. Huw Lloyd-Ellis & Nicolas Marceau, 1998. "Getting Over the Hump: A Theory of Crime, Credit and Accumulation," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 65, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal.
  26. Cameron, Samuel, 1988. "The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 301-23.
  27. Marceau, Nicolas, 1997. "Self-selection and violence in the market for crime," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 193-201, June.
  28. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
  29. Landes, William M & Posner, Richard A, 1975. "The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 18(3), pages 875-901, December.
  30. Grossman, Gene M & Katz, Michael L, 1983. "Plea Bargaining and Social Welfare," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 749-57, September.
  31. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Kaplow, Louis, 1993. "Optimal sanctions and differences in individuals' likelihood of avoiding detection," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 217-224, June.
  32. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
  2. Sylvaine Poret, 2005. "Structure verticale d'un réseau de distribution de drogues illicites et politique répressive optimale," Recherches économiques de Louvain, De Boeck Université, vol. 71(4), pages 391-412.
  3. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
  4. Slim, Sadri, 2009. "Du refus de vente au don: une explication de la formation du prix par l´affect
    [From rejection of exchange to gift: regard as an explanation of prices]
    ," MPRA Paper 15317, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Apr 2009.
  5. Lloyd-Ellis, Huw & Marceau, Nicolas, 2003. "Endogenous insecurity and economic development," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 1-29, October.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ris:actuec:v:75:y:1999:i:1:p:123-147. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Bruce Shearer).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.