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Society Versus Jury: A Case for Limiting Behavior

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Author Info
Dominique Demougin () (Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg)
Stephane Pallage () (Economics Department, UQAM)

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Abstract

We model a simple justice system in which a jury is mandated by society to assess the guilt and the punishment of an accused. Jurors are assumed to be almost perfect representatives of society, but they ignore the cost to society of implementing the sentence. As a result the jury is shown to condemn more often and to higher penalties than society would find it optimal. We show that imposing upper and lower limits to penalties helps to align the jury's objective with society's.

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File URL: http://www.unites.uqam.ca/eco/cahiers/wp9907.ps
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Université du Québec à Montréal, Département des sciences économiques in its series Cahiers de recherche du Département des sciences économiques, UQAM with number 9907.

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Length: 18
Date of creation: Aug 1999
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Handle: RePEc:cre:uqamwp:9907

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Related research
Keywords: Jury optimal sentence crime trial asymmetric information

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

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References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1984. "The optimal use of fines and imprisonment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 89-99, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Rasmusen, Eric, 1995. "How optimal penalties change with the amount of harm," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 101-108, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-91, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. James Andreoni, 1991. "Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(3), pages 385-395, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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