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Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature

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  • Nøstbakken, Linda

Abstract

The paper reviews and summarises the literature on regulatory enforcement in fisheries. The focus is on the theoretical literature. First, some of the main contributions from the general economic literature of law enforcement are presented, along with extensions that are considered relevant to the study of fisheries law enforcement. Second, a review of the economic literature of law enforcement applied to the study of fisheries is provided. Finally, the paper presents gaps in the fisheries economics literature on regulatory enforcement and offers some possibilities for future work.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6VCD-4PB167Y-2/2/4656de3b2b7ce90e54c9a06343b073cb
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.

Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
Pages: 293-300

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Handle: RePEc:eee:marpol:v:32:y:2008:i:3:p:293-300

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol

Related research

Keywords: Fisheries Law enforcement Non-compliance;

References

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  1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1999. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 6993, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Anastasios Xepapadeas, . "Regulation and Evolution of Compliance in Common Pool Resources," Working Papers 0312, University of Crete, Department of Economics.
  3. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 2001. "Corruption and optimal law enforcement," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 1-24, July.
  4. Rabin, Matthew, 1997. "Psychology and Economics," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt8jd5z5j2, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
  5. Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.
  6. Parzival Copes, 1986. "A Critical Review of the Individual Quota as a Device in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 62(3), pages 278-291.
  7. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
  8. Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1994. "Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 1039-66, October.
  9. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
  10. Milliman, Scott R., 1986. "Optimal fishery management in the presence of illegal activity," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 363-381, December.
  11. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1991. "A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies among Individuals," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 618-21, June.
  12. Sumaila, U.R. & Alder, J. & Keith, H., 2006. "Global scope and economics of illegal fishing," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 30(6), pages 696-703, November.
  13. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2006. "Public Enforcement of Law," Discussion Papers 05-016, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  14. Sethi, Rajiv & Somanathan, E, 1996. "The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 766-88, September.
  15. Carlos Chavez & Hugo Salgado, 2005. "Individual Transferable Quota Markets under Illegal Fishing," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 31(3), pages 303-324, 07.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Holstein, Fredrik & Gren, Ing-Marie, 2013. "Violation of environmental regulations in Sweden: Economic motives, environmental attitudes, and social capital," Working Paper Series 2013:3, Department Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences.
  2. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2013. "Formal and informal quota enforcement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 191-215.

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