Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature
AbstractThe paper reviews and summarises the literature on regulatory enforcement in fisheries. The focus is on the theoretical literature. First, some of the main contributions from the general economic literature of law enforcement are presented, along with extensions that are considered relevant to the study of fisheries law enforcement. Second, a review of the economic literature of law enforcement applied to the study of fisheries is provided. Finally, the paper presents gaps in the fisheries economics literature on regulatory enforcement and offers some possibilities for future work.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Marine Policy.
Volume (Year): 32 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3 (May)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Fisheries Law enforcement Non-compliance;
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