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A note on marginal deterrence

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Author Info
Shavell, Steven
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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V7M-45F9NKK-10/2/39c0e450516df85462e1129ad8a4afef
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 12 (1992)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 345-355
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:12:y:1992:i:3:p:345-355

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  1. Immordino, Giovanni & Pagano, Marco & Polo, Michele, 2009. "Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?," CEPR Discussion Papers 7280, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Giovanni Immordino & Marco Pagano & Michele Polo, 2006. "Norm Flexibility and Private Initiative," Working Papers 314, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  3. Alexander Klein, 2000. "Jail or Fine - Let Them Choose," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0337, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties without Commitment," Working Papers id:2014, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
  5. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Optimal environmental standards under asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
  6. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties Without Commitment," Working papers 175, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.


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