Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets
AbstractIn this paper we endogenize the horizontal structure of illicit drug markets. The key assumption is that the traffickerÃ¢â¬â¢s probability of detection depends on his/her market share. The author show that a stricter law enforcement policy encourages traffickers to permit competitors into the market. Increasing deterrence reduces the quantities supplied by each trafficker but also induces new entry, which cancels out the decrease in individual production at the aggregated level. Equilibrium total quantity and criminal profit are independent of the law enforcement level.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.
Volume (Year): 22 (2006)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544
Other versions of this item:
- Sylvaine Poret & Cyril TÃ©jÃ©do, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," Working Papers 18933, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, France.
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