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Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion

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Author Info
Reinganum, Jennifer F

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Abstract

A model of plea bargaining with asymmetric information is presented. The prosecutor's private information consists of the strength of the case, while the defendant's private information consists of h is guilt or innocence. In equilibrium, a fraction of cases are dismis sed because they are too likely to involve an innocent defendant; in the remaining cases, the prosecutor's offer of a sentence in exchange for a plea of guilty reveals the strength of the case. It is shown t hat unlimited prosecutorial discretion may be socially disadvantageou s since it carries with it the requirement of sequential rationality. Copyright 1988 by American Economic Association.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by American Economic Association in its journal American Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 78 (1988)
Issue (Month): 4 (September)
Pages: 713-28
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Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:78:y:1988:i:4:p:713-28

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  1. Lando, Henrik, 2000. "The Optimal Standard of Proof in Criminal Law When Both Fairness and Deterrence Matter," Working Papers 2000-7, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance. [Downloadable!]
  2. Dhammika Dharmapala & Thomas J. Miceli, 2003. "Search, Seizure and (False?) Arrest: An Analysis of Fourth Amendment Remedies when Police can Plant Evidence," Working papers 2003-37, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Richard Boylan & Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2000. "Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0089, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  4. Motta, Massimo & Polo, Michele, 2000. "Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution," CEPR Discussion Papers 2349, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Inés Macho-Stadler & David Pérez-Castrillo, 2001. "Settlement in Tax Evasion Prosecution," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 495.01, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Tracy Lewis & Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Disclosure of Information in Regulatory Proceedings," CIRANO Working Papers 95s-01, CIRANO. [Downloadable!]
  7. Steeve Mongrain & Joanne Roberts, 2007. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints," Discussion Papers dp07-07, Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University. [Downloadable!]
  8. Garoupa, Nuno & Stephen, Frank, 2003. "A Note on Optimal Law Enforcement with Legal Aid," CEPR Discussion Papers 4113, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Anne van Aaken & Eli Salzberger & Stefan Voigt, . "The Prosecution of Public Figures and the Separation of Powers: Confusion within the Executive Branch," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2003-1-1062, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  10. Luigi Alberto Franzoni, 1995. "Prosecutorial Discretion and Criminal Deterrence," Working Papers 234, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Università di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
  11. Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. Reinganum, 1994. "Settlement Negotiations with Two-Sided Asymmetric Information: Model Duality, Information Distribution and Efficiency," Game Theory and Information 9403009, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  13. Sandeep Dahiya & David Yermack, 1999. "Wealth Creation and Destruction from Brooke Group's Tobacco Litigation Strategy," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-050, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  14. Joanne Roberts, 2000. "Plea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints and Deterrence," Working Papers jorob-00-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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