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Theft as a Paradigm for Departures from Efficiency

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Usher, D

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Abstract

The social cost of theft can be divided into four categories--alternative cost of the labor of the thief, alternative cost of the defensive labor of his victim, destruction of product in the act of theft, and deadweight loss. Theft stands as a paradigm for all departures from efficiency because their social costs can also be subsumed under these categories. The analogy with theft unifies the study of departures from efficiency, simplifies exposition, and places special emphasis upon the deliberate use of one's resources to appropriate what others have produced rather than to produce what others wish to consume. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 39 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 235-52
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Handle: RePEc:oup:oxecpp:v:39:y:1987:i:2:p:235-52

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  1. Halvor Mehlum & Kalle Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2004. "Parasites," Development and Comp Systems 0406003, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  2. Herschel I. Grossman, 1997. ""Make Us a King": Anarchy, Predation, and the State," NBER Working Papers 6289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Alain de Janvry & Elisabeth Sadoulet, 2004. "Optimal Share Contracts under Theft," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 980, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
  4. Kjell Hausken, 2005. "Production and Conflict Models Versus Rent-Seeking Models," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 123(1), pages 59-93, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Mehlum,H. & Moene,K. & Torvik,R., 2000. "Predator or prey? : parasitic enterprises in economic development," Memorandum 27/2000, Oslo University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Amegashie, J. Atsu, 2006. "Incomplete Property Rights, Redistribution, And Welfare," MPRA Paper 3438, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  7. H. I. Grossman & M. Kim, 1999. "Educational Policy: Egalitarian or Elitist?," Working Papers 365, Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna. [Downloadable!]
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