Theft as a Paradigm for Departures from Efficiency
AbstractThe social cost of theft can be divided into four categories--alternative cost of the labor of the thief, alternative cost of the defensive labor of his victim, destruction of product in the act of theft, and deadweight loss. Theft stands as a paradigm for all departures from efficiency because their social costs can also be subsumed under these categories. The analogy with theft unifies the study of departures from efficiency, simplifies exposition, and places special emphasis upon the deliberate use of one's resources to appropriate what others have produced rather than to produce what others wish to consume. Copyright 1987 by Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Oxford University Press in its journal Oxford Economic Papers.
Volume (Year): 39 (1987)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
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