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When do more police induce more crime?

Author

Listed:
  • Federico Weinschelbaum
  • Casilda Lasso de la Vega
  • Oscar Volij

Abstract

We provide a necessary and sufficient condition on the equilibrium of a Walrasian economy for an increase in police expenditure to induce an increase in crime. It turns out that this is essentially the condition for the Laffer curve to be downward sloping at a given ad valorem tax rate. Notably, such a perverse effect of police on crime is consistent with any appropriation technology and could arise even if the level of police protection is the socially optimal one.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Weinschelbaum & Casilda Lasso de la Vega & Oscar Volij, 2022. "When do more police induce more crime?," Asociación Argentina de Economía Política: Working Papers 4609, Asociación Argentina de Economía Política.
  • Handle: RePEc:aep:anales:4609
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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