General and Specific Deterrent Effects of Traffic Enforcement: Do we have to Catch Offenders to Reduce Crashes?
AbstractThe role of deterrence in economics focuses primarily on changing the individual's perceived expected cost of engaging in an illegal activity and the primary impetus of deterrence in law enforcement is to increase the perceived certainty of apprehension and punishment. Using data from the Australian State of Queensland, this paper examined the deterrent effects of increasing the level of police presence and the apprehension rate and found that increasing either the number of random breath tests performed or the proportion of drivers tested positive for drink driving significantly reduced the number of serious crashes on the roads. © 2005 LSE and the University of Bath
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by London School of Economics and University of Bath in its journal Journal of Transport Economics and Policy.
Volume (Year): 39 (2005)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.bath.ac.uk/e-journals/jtep
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Simona Benedettini & Antonio Nicita, 2009. "Deterrence, Incapacitation and Enforcement Design. Evidence from Traffic Enforcement in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena 564, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Antonio Nicita & Simona Benedettini, 2012. "The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy," Department of Economics University of Siena 631, Department of Economics, University of Siena.
- Benedettini, Simona & Nicita, Antonio, 2012. "The costs of avoiding accidents: Selective compliance and the ‘Peltzman effect’ in Italy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 256-270.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.