Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

The Costs of Avoiding Accidents.Selective Compliance and the 'Peltzman Effect' in Italy

Contents:

Author Info

  • Antonio Nicita

    ()

  • Simona Benedettini

    ()

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We empirically investigate the deterrent and offsetting effects of the introduction of a point–record driving license (PDRL) in Italy. We find that the PDRL resulted in a sharp reduction of seat belt offenses, and in a noticeable decrease of road accidents. However, the reduction in occupant fatalities and injuries was associated with an increase in non-occupant ones, suggesting a remarkable “Peltzman effect”. We then discuss whether a given enforcement design, by inducing drivers to make the best use of safety resources already available to them, may generate more external costs than would otherwise occur.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://www.econ-pol.unisi.it/quaderni/631.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 631.

    as in new window
    Length:
    Date of creation: Feb 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:631

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Piazza S.Francesco,7 - 53100 Siena
    Phone: (39)(0577)232620
    Fax: (39)(0577)232661
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.deps.unisi.it/
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: offsetting behavior; point - record driving license; seat belts; traffic law enforcement; traffic fatalities;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. Jean Pinquet & Georges Dionne & Charles Vanasse & Mathieu Maurice, 2009. "Incentive Mechanisms for Safe Driving: A Comparative Analysis with Dynamic Data," Working Papers hal-00414479, HAL.
    2. Bourgeon, Jean-Marc & Picard, Pierre, 2007. "Point-record driving licence and road safety: An economic approach," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 235-258, February.
    3. Evans, William N & Graham, John D, 1991. " Risk Reduction or Risk Compensation? The Case of Mandatory Safety-Belt Use Laws," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 4(1), pages 61-73, January.
    4. Christopher J. Ruhm, 2000. "Are Recessions Good For Your Health?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 115(2), pages 617-650, May.
    5. Andersson, Henrik & Lundborg, Petter, 2006. "Perception of Own Death Risk: An Analysis of Road-Traffic and Overall Mortality Risks," Working Papers 2006:1, Swedish National Road & Transport Research Institute (VTI).
    6. Christopher Carpenter & Carlos Dobkin, 2007. "The Effect of Alcohol Consumption on Mortality: Regression Discontinuity Evidence from the Minimum Drinking Age," NBER Working Papers 13374, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2003. "The Role of Warnings in Regulation: Keeping Control with Less Punishment," Memorandum 24/2003, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    8. Sen, Anindya, 2001. "An Empirical Test of the Offset Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 481-510, October.
    9. Alma Cohen & Liran Einav, 2003. "The Effects of Mandatory Seat Belt Laws on Driving Behavior and Traffic Fatalities," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 85(4), pages 828-843, November.
    10. Steven D. Levitt & Jack Porter, 2001. "Sample Selection In The Estimation Of Air Bag And Seat Belt Effectiveness," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 83(4), pages 603-615, November.
    11. Maria De Paola & Vincenzo Scoppa & Mariatiziana Falcone, 2010. "The Deterrent Effects of Penalty Point System in Driving Licenses: A Regression Discontinuity Approach," Working Papers 201004, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza (Ex Dipartimento di Economia e Statistica).
    12. Garbacz, Christopher, 1990. "Estimating seat belt effectiveness with seat belt usage data from the Centers for Disease Control," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 83-88, September.
    13. Jose Arranz & Ana Gil, 2009. "Traffic accidents, deaths and alcohol consumption," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(20), pages 2583-2595.
    14. Richard Tay, 2005. "General and Specific Deterrent Effects of Traffic Enforcement: Do we have to Catch Offenders to Reduce Crashes?," Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, London School of Economics and University of Bath, vol. 39(2), pages 209-224, May.
    15. Anindya Sen & Brent Mizzen, 2007. "Estimating the Impact of Seat Belt Use on Traffic Fatalities: Empirical Evidence from Canada," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 33(3), pages 315-336, September.
    16. Peltzman, Sam, 1975. "The Effects of Automobile Safety Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(4), pages 677-725, August.
    17. Benedettini Simona & Nicita Antonio, 2009. "The Italian Demerit Point System, six years later. A "Beckerian" story?," Mercato Concorrenza Regole, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 2, pages 323-354.
    18. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    19. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 1993. "A Model of Optimal Fines for Repeat Offenders," NBER Working Papers 3739, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    20. Young, Douglas J. & Likens, Thomas W., 2000. "Alcohol Regulation and Auto Fatalities," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 107-126, March.
    21. Brons, Martijn & Nijkamp, Peter & Pels, Eric & Rietveld, Piet, 2008. "A meta-analysis of the price elasticity of gasoline demand. A SUR approach," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(5), pages 2105-2122, September.
    22. Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1998. "On offense history and the theory of deterrence," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 305-324, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as in new window

    Cited by:
    1. José I. Castillo-Manzano & Mercedes Castro-Nuño & Xavier Fageda, 2014. "“Are traffic violators criminals? Searching for answers in experiences of European countries”," IREA Working Papers 201415, University of Barcelona, Research Institute of Applied Economics, revised May 2014.

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:631. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Fabrizio Becatti).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.