1. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 1984. "Pigouvian Taxation with Administrative Costs," NBER Working Papers 0742, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Mitchell Polinsky, A. & Shavell, Steven, 1982. "Pigouvian taxation with administrative costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 385-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
3. Stigler, George J, 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 526-36, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
4. Steven Shavell, 1989. "Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 3062, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1088-1108, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

1. Møllgaard, Peter, 2002. "Must Trust Bust?," Working Papers 02-2002, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
2. Thierry Penard & Saïd Souam, 2002. "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, ADRES, issue 66, pages 09, Avril-Jui. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Thierry Penard ; Saïd Souam, . "Collusion et politique de la concurrence en information asymétrique," Working Papers 99-26, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique. [Downloadable!]
3. John K. Stranlund & Carlos A. Chavez & Mauricio G. Villena, 2007. "The Optimal Pricing of Pollution When Enforcement is Costly," Working Papers 2007-6, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stranlund, John K. & Chávez, Carlos A. & Villena, Mauricio G., 2009. "The optimal pricing of pollution when enforcement is costly," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 183-191, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. John K. Stranlund, 2006. "The Regulatory Choice of Noncompliance in Emissions Trading Programs," Working Papers 2006-7, University of Massachusetts Amherst, Department of Resource Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • John Stranlund, 2007. "The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 38(1), pages 99-117, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Keith N. Hylton & Haizhen Lin, 2008. "Innovation and Optimal Punishment, with Antitrust Applications," Working Papers 2008-09, Indiana University, Kelley School of Business, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
6. Alexander E. Saak, 2002. "Identity Preservation and False Labeling in the Food Supply Chain," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 02-wp295, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
7. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economics Working Papers 246, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Dec 1997. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 278-88, April.
8. Marette, Stéphan, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Staff General Research Papers 12451, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Stephan Marette, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) Publications 05-wp412, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
   • Stephan Marette, 2005. "Inspection Intensity and Market Structure," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 05-wp412, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
9. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "A Note on the Complementarity of Uniform Emission Standards and Monitoring Strategies," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2009/06, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
10. Saak, Alexander E., 2002. "Identity Preservation and False Labeling in the Food Supply Chain," Staff General Research Papers 2062, Iowa State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
11. Ogus, Anthony, 2005. "Towards Appropriate Institutional Arrangements for Regulation in Less Developed Countries," Centre on Regulation and Competition (CRC) Working papers 30644, University of Manchester, Institute for Development Policy and Management (IDPM). [Downloadable!]
12. Alexander E. Saak, 2002. "Identity Preservation and False Labeling in the Food Supply Chain," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications 02-wp295, Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State University. [Downloadable!]
13. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
14. Dominique Demougin & Claude Fluet, 1999. "Costly Sanctions and the Maximum Penalty Principle," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 100, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal. [Downloadable!]
15. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Pollution standards, costly monitoring and fines," Discussion Paper 9, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
16. Emma Aisbett & Larry Karp & Carol McAusland, 2008. "Police-powers, regulatory takings and the efficient compensation of domestic and foreign investors," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series 1061, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
17. Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2007. "Red ink in the rearview mirror: local fiscal conditions and the issuance of traffic tickets," Working Papers 2006-048, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Thomas A. Garrett & Gary A. Wagner, 2009. "Red Ink in the Rearview Mirror: Local Fiscal Conditions and the Issuance of Traffic Tickets," Journal of Law & Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 71-90, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
18. Carmen Arguedas, 2008. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 41(2), pages 155-168, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Arguedas, Carmen, 2007. "To Comply or Not To Comply? Pollution Standard Setting Under Costly Monitoring and Sanctioning," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2007/13, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
19. Makowsky, Michael & Thomas, Stratmann, 2008. "More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads," MPRA Paper 14360, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Michael D. Makowsky & Thomas Stratmann, 2009. "More Tickets, Fewer Accidents: How Cash-Strapped Towns Make for Safer Roads," Working Papers 2009-02, Towson University, Department of Economics, revised Jun 2009. [Downloadable!]
20. Arguedas, Carmen, 2005. "Optimal environmental standards under asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement," Discussion Paper 10, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
21. Dietrich Earnhart, 1998. "Civil Litigation, Access to Government-Held Information, and Coordination of Public and Private Enforcement in the Czech Republic," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 113-141, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Nuno Garoupa, 2000. "Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Economics Working Papers 454, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Garoupa, Nuno, 2001. "Optimal magnitude and probability of fines," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(9), pages 1765-1771, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)