This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A model of optimal fines for repeat offenders

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Mitchell Polinsky, A.
Rubinfeld, Daniel L.

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-458WP11-4P/2/1befc13b4f53bb707084767dd3e32994
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 46 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
Pages: 291-306
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:46:y:1991:i:3:p:291-306

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Landsberger, Michael & Meilijson, Isaac, 1982. "Incentive generating state dependent penalty system : The case of income tax evasion," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 333-352, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Stigler, George J, 1970. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(3), pages 526-36, May-June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Shavell, Steven, 1991. "Specific versus General Enforcement of Law," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(5), pages 1088-1108, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law," NBER Working Papers 9698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2006. "Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat Offenders," Serie Research Memoranda 0008, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Anna Rita Germani, 2007. "The Environmental Enforcement in the Civil and the Common Law Systems. A Case on the Economic Effects of Legal Institutions," Quaderni DSEMS 22-2007, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia. [Downloadable!]
  4. Been-Lon Chen, 2003. "Tax Evasion in a Model of Endogenous Growth," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 6(2), pages 381-403, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet?," Working papers 2009-25, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Tim Friehe, . "Escalating Penalties and Imperfect Information," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1136, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  7. Tim Friehe, 2009. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 165-183, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Thomas J. Miceli, 2008. "Deterrence, Incapacitation, and Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2008-44, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Volker Meier, 2001. "On Prison and Therapy," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 47-56, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Ernesto Dal Bó & Marko Terviö, 2008. "Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing," NBER Working Papers 14508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Thomas J. Miceli, 2009. "Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment," Working papers 2009-16, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You too can volunteer with RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.