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A Note on the Optimal Punishment for Repeat Offenders

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Author Info
Winand Emons

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Abstract

Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. The agents are wealth constrained so that increasing the fine for the first offense means a reduction in the sanction for the second offense and vice versa. The agents may follow history dependent strategies. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. The optimal sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses. Indeed, the sanction for the first offense equals the entire wealth while the sanction for the second offense is zero.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Universitaet Bern, Departement Volkswirtschaft in its series Diskussionsschriften with number dp0104.

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Date of creation: Dec 2001
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Handle: RePEc:ube:dpvwib:dp0104

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Related research
Keywords: crime and punishment repeat offenders

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

Cited by:
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  1. Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Emons, Winand, 2003. "Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offenders," CEPR Discussion Papers 4131, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Motchenkova, Evgenia, 2006. "Cost Minimizing Sequential Punishment Policies for Repeat Offenders," Serie Research Memoranda 0008, Free University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Thomas J. Miceli, 2004. "Sentencing Guidelines, Judicial Discretion, And Social Values," Working papers 2004-23, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  5. roberto galbiati, . "Sanctions, Now or Later? The Optimal use of Warnings in Law Enforcement," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2006-1-1143, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
  6. Christian At & Nathalie Chappe, 2005. "Crime timing," Economics Bulletin, Economics Bulletin, vol. 11(2), pages 1-7. [Downloadable!]
  7. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, 2005. "The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," NBER Working Papers 11780, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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