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On offense history and the theory of deterrence

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Author Info
Polinsky, A. Mitchell
Shavell, Steven

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal International Review of Law and Economics.

Volume (Year): 18 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 305-324
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Handle: RePEc:eee:irlaec:v:18:y:1998:i:3:p:305-324

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  1. Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, 2004. "A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders," Working papers 2004-39, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mohamed Jellal & Nuno Garoupa, 1999. "Dynamic Optimal Law Enforcement with Learning," Economics Working Papers 402, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
  3. Chris William Sanchirico, 2004. "Relying on the Information of Interested--and Potentially Dishonest--Parties," Law and Economics 0403001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  4. repec:bep:dewple:2006-1-1136 is not listed on IDEAS
  5. Tim Friehe, 2009. "Escalating penalties for repeat offenders: a note on the role of information," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 97(2), pages 165-183, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B. Ward, 2004. "Enforcement and Environmental Compliance: A Statistical Analysis of the Pulp and Paper Industry," Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University 0414, Department of Economics, Tufts University. [Downloadable!]
  7. Ernesto Dal Bó & Marko Terviö, 2008. "Self-Esteem, Moral Capital, and Wrongdoing," NBER Working Papers 14508, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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