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Who Should Pay For Collecting Taxes

Author

Listed:
  • C. Eugene Steuerle

Abstract

How can the tax laws be enforced more economically and more efficiently? After examining the ways the IRS is currently financed, Eugene Steuerle concludes that current methods give inadequate attention to both the benefits and the costs of tax administration.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Eugene Steuerle, 1986. "Who Should Pay For Collecting Taxes," Books, American Enterprise Institute, number 650820, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:aei:rpbook:650820
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Polinsky, A Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1992. "Enforcement Costs and the Optimal Magnitude and Probability of Fines," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(1), pages 133-148, April.
    2. Yitzhaki, Shlomo & Vakneen, Yitzhak, 1989. "On the Shadow Price of a Tax Inspector," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 44(3), pages 492-505.
    3. Joel Slemrod, 2002. "Trust in Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 9187, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Slemrod, Joel, 1998. "On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social Capital," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association;National Tax Journal, vol. 51(3), pages 485-491, September.
    5. Mark Toma, 1989. "Will bounty-hunting revenue agents increase enforcement?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 61(3), pages 247-260, June.
    6. Slemrod, Joel, 1998. "On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social Capital," National Tax Journal, National Tax Association, vol. 51(n. 3), pages 485-91, September.
    7. Dimitri Romanov, 2003. "Costs and Benefits of Marginal Reallocation of Tax Agency Resources in Pursuit of the Hard-to-Tax," International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series, at AYSPS, GSU paper0323, International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tax reform; IRS;

    JEL classification:

    • H - Public Economics

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