Medical errors: Getting the incentives right
AbstractThis work examines the role of penalties as providers of incentives to prevent medical errors and ensure that such incidents, once they occur, become common knowledge. It is shown that a scheme with two penalties (accountability and non-report) is able to induce the first-best solution. However, this scheme needs not imply a punitive environment, but may, under given circumstances, yield insignificant and even negative penalties. Alternative incentive systems, such as voluntary reporting and legal immunity, are found to have less desirable properties. An exception is the principle of confidentiality (anonymity) which turns out to be an optimal scheme. It is also shown that when a judicial upper limit is binding, for the non-report penalty, it becomes rationale to go “soft” on the accountability penalty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme in its series HERO On line Working Paper Series with number 2003:10.
Length: 27 pages
Date of creation: 21 Jun 2009
Date of revision:
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Iatrogenic injury; adverse events; reporting incentives; confidentiality;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
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