AbstractMost experts would agree that the current medical malpractice system in the United States does not work effectively either to compensate victims fairly or prevent injuries caused by medical errors. Policy responses to a series of medical malpractice crises have not resulted in effective reform and have not altered the fundamental incentives of the stakeholders. In Medical Malpractice, economist Frank Sloan and lawyer Lindsey Chepke examine the U.S. medical malpractice process from legal, medical, economic, and insurance perspectives, analyze past efforts at reform, and offer realistic, achievable policy recommendations. They review the considerable empirical evidence in a balanced fashion and assess objectively what works in the current system and what does not. Sloan and Chepke argue that the complexity of medical malpractice stems largely from the interaction of the four discrete markets that determine outcomes--legal, medical malpractice insurance, medical care, and government activity. After describing what the evidence shows about the functioning of medical malpractice, types of defensive medicine, and the effects of past reforms, they examine such topics as scheduling damages as an alternative to flat caps, jury behavior, health courts, incentives to prevent medical errors, insurance regulation, reinsurance, no-fault insurance, and suggestions for future reforms. Medical Malpractice is the most comprehensive treatment of malpractice available, integrating findings from several different areas of research and describing them accessibly in nontechnical language. It will be an essential reference for anyone interested in medical malpractice.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoThis book is provided by The MIT Press in its series MIT Press Books with number 0262195720 and published in 2008.
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://mitpress.mit.edu
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Grepperud, Sverre, 2009. "Medical errors: Getting the incentives right," HERO On line Working Paper Series 2003:10, Oslo University, Health Economics Research Programme.
- Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2005.
"The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care,"
in: Frontiers in Health Policy Research, Volume 8
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Baicker Katherine & Chandra Amitabh, 2005. "The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care," Forum for Health Economics & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 8(1), pages 1-29, January.
- Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2004. "The Effect of Malpractice Liability on the Delivery of Health Care," NBER Working Papers 10709, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Thomas J. Kniesner & Andrew Friedson, 2011.
"Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms,"
Center for Policy Research Working Papers
132, Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University.
- Andrew Friedson & Thomas Kniesner, 2012. "Losers and losers: Some demographics of medical malpractice tort reforms," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 45(2), pages 115-133, October.
- Friedson, Andrew I. & Kniesner, Thomas J., 2011. "Losers and Losers: Some Demographics of Medical Malpractice Tort Reforms," IZA Discussion Papers 5921, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Donald J., Wright, 2011.
"Medical malpractice and physician liability under a negligence rule,"
International Review of Law and Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 205-211, September.
- Wright, Donald J., 2011. "Medical Malpractice and Physician Liability Under a Negligence Rule," Working Papers 2011-04, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
- Janet Currie & W. Bentley MacLeod, 2006.
"First Do No Harm?: Tort Reform and Birth Outcomes,"
NBER Working Papers
12478, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2005.
"The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums,"
NBER Working Papers
11160, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, 2006. "The Labor Market Effects of Rising Health Insurance Premiums," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 24(3), pages 609-634, July.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Mark B. McClellan, 2000. "How Liability Law Affects Medical Productivity," NBER Working Papers 7533, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Benjamin Ho & Elaine Liu, 2011. "Does sorry work? The impact of apology laws on medical malpractice," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 43(2), pages 141-167, October.
- Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, 2009.
"The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurers' Ultimate Losses,"
Journal of Risk & Insurance,
The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 76(1), pages 197-219.
- Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi & Tom Baker, 2006. "The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurers' Ultimate Losses," NBER Working Papers 12086, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Mark McClellan, 1998. "The Effects of Malpractice Pressure and Liability Reforms on Physicians' Perceptions of Medical Care," NBER Working Papers 6346, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Martin Boyer & Karine Gobert, 2009. "Professional Liability Insurance Contracts: Claims Made Versus Occurrence Policies," Cahiers de recherche 09-03, Departement d'Economique de la Faculte d'administration à l'Universite de Sherbrooke.
- Anca Cotet, 2009. "Tort Reform and the Demand for Medical Care: Evidence from State-by-State Variation in Non-Economic Damages Caps," Working Papers 200901, Ball State University, Department of Economics, revised Mar 2010.
- Patricia Born & M. Martin Boyer, 2008.
"Claims-Made and Reported Policies and Insurer Profitability in Medical Malpractice,"
CIRANO Working Papers
- Patricia Born & M. Martin Boyer, 2011. "Claims‐Made and Reported Policies and Insurer Profitability in Medical Malpractice," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 78(1), pages 139-162, 03.
- Sloan, Frank A. & Shadle, John H., 2009. "Is there empirical evidence for "Defensive Medicine"? A reassessment," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 481-491, March.
- Luigi Buzzacchi & Gilberto Turati, 2009. "Collective Risks in Local Administrations: Can a Private Insurer Be Better than a Public Mutual Fund?," Working papers 3, Former Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato", University of Torino.
- Daniel P. Kessler & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 2004. "Empirical Study of the Civil Justice System," NBER Working Papers 10825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jake Furbush).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.