This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Avoiding tax avoidance: A (repeated) game-theoretic approach

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Greenberg, Joseph
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WJ3-4CYH459-22/2/49c1f22deaba019304eb7206aa76ce91
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 32 (1984)
Issue (Month): 1 (February)
Pages: 1-13
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:32:y:1984:i:1:p:1-13

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Marisa Ratto & Thibaud Verge, 2002. "Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 02/054, Department of Economics, University of Bristol, UK. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Nir Dagan & Yossi Tobol, 2005. "Tax evasion, informants, and optimal auditing policy," Economic theory and game theory 021, Nir Dagan. [Downloadable!]
  3. Nipoli Kamdar, 1997. "Corporate income tax compliance: A time series analysis," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 25(1), pages 37-49, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1990. "Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners," Working Papers 744, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Bénédicte Coestier & Nathalie Fombaron, 2003. "L'audit en assurance," THEMA Working Papers 2003-41, THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise. [Downloadable!]
  6. Mukhtar Ali & H. Cecil & James Knoblett, 2001. "The effects of tax rates and enforcement policies on taxpayer compliance: A study of self-employed taxpayers," Atlantic Economic Journal, International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 29(2), pages 186-202, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Kurt J. Beron & Helen V. Tauchen & Ann Dryden Witte, 1988. "A Structural Equation Model for Tax Compliance and Auditing," NBER Working Papers 2556, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2008/02, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History). [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Frank A Cowell, 2003. "Sticks and Carrots," STICERD - Distributional Analysis Research Programme Papers 68, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE. [Downloadable!]
  10. Yitzhaki, Shlomo & Vakneen, Yitzhak, 1988. "The shadow price of a tax inspector," Policy Research Working Paper Series 76, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  11. Theodore Groves & Maxwell B. Stinchcombe & Montserrat Viladrich, 1992. "Optimal Monitoring of Oil Spills: Control in a Stochastic, Dynamic Context," University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series 92-48, Department of Economics, UC San Diego. [Downloadable!]
  12. Simone Pellegrino & Massimiliano Piacenza & Gilberto Turati, 2008. "The Runaway Taxpayer or: Is Prior Tax Notice Effective against Scofflaws?," Working Papers 1, University of Torino, Department of Economics and Public Finance "G. Prato". [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? About 1000 archives contribute their bibliographic data to RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.